College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

1991

The Civil Rights Hydra
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "The Civil Rights Hydra" (1991). Faculty Publications. 424.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/424

Copyright c 1991 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Faculty and Deans

THE CIVIL RIGHTS HYDRA
Neal Devins*
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA. By Hugh Davis Graham. New York: Ox-

ford University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 578. $29.95.
The story of federal civil rights enforcement may be impossible to
chronicle. Antidiscrimination requirementsbind all federal agencies1
and each agency brings to this drama its own unique experiences. Indeed, during the Reagan years, significant civil rights enforcement
controversies emerged in such unlikely places as the National Endowment for the Humanities,2the Federal Communications Commission,3
the Department of the Treasury,4and the Department of Transportation.5 There were also controversies involving the usual suspects
the Department of Justice,6the Equal Employment Opportunity Com* Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government,
College of William & Mary. A.B.
1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. - Ed. Thanks to Herman Belz, Larry
Evans, Phil Lyons, Jeremy Rabkin, and Charles Shanor for valuable commentary. All errors are
my own.
1. See infra notes 142-43.
2. See Hearing on Reauthorizationof the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities
Act of 1965: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on PostsecondaryEducation of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (questioning NEA refusal to file an affirmative
action plan with the EEOC).
3. See Hearings on HR. 5373 Before Subcomm. on Telecommunications,Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
(oversight hearings questioning propriety of FCC reexaminationof race and gender preferences);
see also Devins, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: Requiemfor a Heavyweight,69 TEXASL. REV. 125
(1990).
4. See Administration'sChange in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially DiscriminatoryPrivate Schools: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Waysand Means, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 193-94, 213-14, 218-20, 236, 237 (1982) (testimony of R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secretary, Treasury; Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General; and William Bradford Reynolds, Asst. Attorney General, questioning propriety of IRS rescission of nondiscrimination rules
governing receipt of federal tax exemptions); see also Rabkin, Behind the Tax-Exempt School
Debate, PUB. INT., Summer 1982, at 21.
5. See The Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program of the Federal-Aid Highway Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transportationof the Senate Comm. on Environmentand Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Reauthorizationof the Federal-Aid Highway Program:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
AND PUBLICWORKS,FEDERAL-AIDHIGHWAY
(1986); SENATECOMM.ON ENVIRONMENT
ACT OF 1986, S. REP. NO. 369, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
6. Controversy and dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice is best reflected in the
Senate's failure to confirm William Bradford Reynolds, Reagan's Assistant Attorney General for
civil rights, as Associate Attorney General. See Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be
AssociateAttorneyGeneralof the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For overview critiques, see U.S. COMMN.ON CIV. RIGHTS,
FEDERALENFORCEMENT
OFEQUALEMPLOYMENT
45-65 (1987) [hereinafter
REQUIREMENTS
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mission,7 the Department of Labor,8 the Small Business Administration,9 the Department of Education,10 the Department of Housing and
Urban Development," and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.'2
This complex web does not lend itself to generalization and, not surprisingly, scholars have been reluctant to undertake the arduous task
of a comprehensive treatment of this topic.
A recent and welcome attempt at a far-ranging examination of federal civil rights enforcement is Hugh Davis Graham's The Civil Rights
Era.13 Graham examines the years 1960-1972 and makes his subject
the executive branch. The executive branch is chosen in order to examine the "full policy cycle."'4 As Graham aptly notes: "[W]hile
presidents and congresses come and go, the federal agencies abide, defining through administrative law and regulation the precise meaning
of broad statutory provisions that Congress could not conceivably tailor to the nuances of America's workaday life" (p. 7). Graham chose
the 1960-1972 time period for two reasons. First, in Graham's estimation, comprehensive federal attention to civil rights begins with the
1960 Kennedy election and by 1972 the "new order" of comprehensive
civil rights enforcement was set in place (p. 4). Second, during this
period, civil rights policy evolved from a focus on individualized fair
1987 CRC REPORT];
Reynolds, The Reagan Administration'sCivil Rights Policy: The Challenge
for the Future, 42 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Departmentsof Commerce,Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departmentsof Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 354 (1985) [hereinafterHearings] (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a Reagan appointee criticizing Carter-era
guidelines as a "rigid and mechanical mathematical approach" concerning discrimination);
ANDLABOR,99THCONG.,2D SESS.,REPORTONTHE
STAFFOFHOUSECOMM.ONEDUCATION
OPPORTUBY THE EQUALEMPLOYMENT
OF CIVILRIGHTSENFORCEMENT
INVESTIGATION
NITYCOMMN.(Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafterREPORT](criticizing EEOC pattern and practice
charge processing).
8. See AffirmativeAction and Federal Contract Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (reviewing White House examination of Executive Order 11,246); see also McDowell,
AffirmativeInaction, POLY.REV., Spring 1989, at 32.
9. See supra note 5.
FAILUREAND FRAUDIN CIVIL
10. See HOUSECOMM.ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS,
BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION,H.R. REP. NO. 334, 100th
RIGHTSENFORCEMENT
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (criticizing Department of Education enforcement of civil rights laws); see
33-59 (1988).
also N. AMAKER,CIVILRIGHTSANDTHEREAGANADMINISTRATION
11. See N. AMAKER,supra note 10, at 79-101.
12. See Presidential Nominations to the Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on the Nominations of MorrisB. Abram, John A. Bunzel, Robert A. Destro, and Linda ChavezBefore the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter Nomination
Hearings];see also Comment, The Rise and Fall of the United States Commissionon Civil Rights,
22 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1987).
13. Hugh Davis Graham is Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore.
14. "Full policy cycle," in addition to examining "the formulation and enactment phases of
the policy cycle," considers "the obscure and complex phase of implementation." P. 5.
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treatmentobjectivesto emphasison group claims for proportionate
representation(p. 5).
Graham'sobjectiveis lofty and he accomplishesmuch. The Civil
RightsEra is a gripping,literateaccountof landmarkcivil rightslegislation governingemployment,housing, and voting. The executive
branchfocusis also usefulboth in demonstrating
the fundamentalrole
played by the White House in the enactmentof these legislativereformsandin providinginsightfulglimpsesinto the Kennedy,Johnson,
and Nixon administrations.Graham,moreover,providesrevealing
looks at severalexecutiveinitiatives,many of which are as influential
as civil rightslegislation.'5For thesereasons,TheCivilRightsEra is a
highly accessibleand quite worthwhileadditionto the literature.
Graham'sundertakingis only a mixed success, however. Graham's suggestionthat civil rights policy shiftedfrom simple nondiscriminationto grouprightsbetween1966and 1968(p. 456) is subject
to question. Although- as Grahamconvincinglydemonstrates
Congressrejectedboth numericalproofsof discriminationand quota
hiring in passingthe 1964 Civil Rights Act,'6 ample evidenceexists
that civil rights activistsboth inside and outsidethe Executivewere
interestedin numericalequalityfrom the start.17The greattransformationof civil rightspolicy then is more a reflectionof how the administrationof law transcendsthe letter of the law. This important
point buttressesGraham's"full policy cycle" emphasis,but it is not
made in The CivilRightsEra. More significantly,Grahamdoes not
meet the challengehe sets for himselfthroughhis use of "full policy
cycle" analysis,namely,the demonstrationof the strangleholdpossessed by the permanentcivil rights establishmentover the White
House and its appointees. Neither the relationshipbetweeninterest
groupsand enforcementagenciesnor the relationshipbetweenoversight committeesand enforcementagenciesis givenserioustreatment.
Moreover,relativeto the extensivetreatmentgiven the enactmentof
civil rights legislation and the promulgationof executive orders,
agencyenforcementdecisionsare givenshortshrift. In some respects,
this failingis inevitable.The story of implementation
beginsafterthe
enactmentof legislation. TheCivilRightsEra is fundamentallya book
about a periodin which electedbrancheffortsfocusedon the enactment stage. Furthermore,Grahamseems only marginallyinterested
in the politicsof implementationduringthe 1960-1972period.
15. Graham clearly deserves accolades for his exhaustive research of White House sources
available through the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon libraries. See pp. 477-79 (describing research methodology).
16. Pp. 125-52. Quota hiring mandates the employment of a predetermined percentage of
some group (women, racial minorities, etc.) in the workplace; numerical proofs of discrimination
pay attention to group imbalance in determining whether an employer has engaged in illegal
discrimination.
17. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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These omissions are truly unfortunate. The 1960-1972 period is a
benchmark for the administrativepresidency. The twilight of the imperial presidency associated with the New Deal was the Johnson presidency, and the Nixon administrationmarked the imperial presidency's
demise.18 From 1958 to 1974, Congress became more liberal and
more assertive.19 This change was caused in large measure by the
weakening of conservative southern Democrats in Congress associated
with 1960s civil rights reform.20 Congress' rising assertiveness,during
the Nixon years at least, also was reflected in increasing legislative
oversight of policy implementation. Recognizing that Congress has
ultimate power over program content and funding, agency heads
proved responsive to committee concerns. By the early 1970s, Richard Nixon launched the so-called "administrativepresidency"21in an
effort to restore White House control of the administrative state.
These dramatic sea changes in government are hardly noticeable in
The Civil Rights Era. Graham's work is too much about specific
events and too little about changing landscapes. In the end, it is an
excellent book that dares to be great but does not quite make it. Indeed, Graham's ambitions and his skillful presentationof an epic story
of civil rights reform make the book's inability to reach its intended
heights a bit surprising.
This review serves as a partial bridge between what Graham intends and what he delivers. Part I describes some of the book's ample
lessons. Attention is placed in Part I on Graham's too-short discussion of agency policymaking and administration. Part II supplements
this discussion by referring to pertinent 1960-1972 era policymaking
and administration not given serious treatment in the book. Part III

-

consistent with Graham's inadequately proven thesis -

argues that

it is extremely difficultfor a president to centralize civil rights enforcement. This Part focuses on the Reagan White House's limited success
in changing the face of civil rights enforcement.
The Reagan experience, however, suggests a far more complicated
story than the one depicted by Graham. The presidency, despite the
difficulties of centralization, is neither enfeebled nor captured by civil
rights interest groups. An administration with a clear ideological vi18. Prior to the middle or late 1960s, according to Martin Shapiro, the norm was that
"[c]ourts should defer to Congress, Congress should defer to the President. So courts really were
to defer to the Executive." Shapiro, A.P.A.: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 451
(1986).
19. See Melnick, The Courts, Congress,and ProgrammaticRights, in REMAKING AMERICAN
POLITICS 188 (R. Harris & S. Milikis eds. 1989).
20. See id.
21. R. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1975). With respect to the fundamental importance of administration, see P. ARNOLD,
PRESIDENT (1986). It is Arnold's position that "the president
MAKING THE MANAGERIAL

ought to be concerned with administration, not because he is a manager but because administration is part of the system through which his choices become policy." Id. at 363.
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sion, a commitment to that vision, and political savvy can effectively
centralize its civil rights enforcement efforts. The Reagan administration, contrary to popular wisdom, lacked both a clear ideological vision with respect to civil rights and a commitment to pursue that
vision. Instead, the administrationviewed civil rights as a matter to be
worked out through the tugs and pulls of politics. Consequently, civil
rights centralization took a back seat to tax reform, federalism, and
deregulation objectives.
Reagan administration civil rights enforcement efforts also were
marred by political ineptitude. Unwilling to work within the political
culture they inherited, Reagan political appointees sacrificed gains in
enforcement by engaging in pitched and counterproductive battles
with Congress and the civil rights community. A more adept administration, contrary to Graham's assertions, would have made far more
progress in advancing its agenda.
Conservatives who bemoan the death of the presidency are in error. The presidency - albeit constrained - remains potent. By summarizing and extending Graham's work, this review provides a
glimpse into the exercise and management of presidential power.
I.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA DESCRIBED

Graham describes his work as a story about a "social movement[ ]" which "broke the back of the system of racial segregation"(p.
3). As such, Graham considers all federal action in the civil rights
arena fair game for investigation. From this huge smorgasbord, Graham has chosen employment, voting, fair housing, and the equal rights
amendment. By book's end, however, it is apparent that only one issue truly matters to Graham. The dominant target of Graham's study
is employment - both the enactment and enforcement of statutory
antidiscrimination prohibitions and executive initiatives to increase
minority employment among government contractors.
Graham accomplishes much through this choice of emphasis.
First, employment best reveals the "full policy cycle" that Graham
seeks to penetrate. Unlike court-driven school desegregation and voting, employment policy is fundamentally the domain of the administrative state. Second, the shift from individual protection to group
rights was played out more explicitly in the employment context than
in any other area.
The inclusion of other select topics, then, enriches and provides a
broader frame for understanding the establishment and evolution of
employment policy. To the extent that Graham intends to tell a comprehensive story of 1960-1972 reforms, moreover, these otherwise ancillary matters are essential. In any event, Graham's discussion of
voting, housing, and equal rights - even if tangential - provides important insights to these topics. The housing chapter, for example,
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clarifies the common misperception that the 1968 Civil Rights Act was
enacted to stave off racial unrest in the wake of the April 1968 King
assassination. In March 1968, after President Johnson had effectively
given up on open housing legislation due to prior legislative disinterest, the Senate "astonishing[ly]" pursued the matter with vigor - including invoking cloture on a southern filibuster (p. 270). While the
King murder accelerated House action, Congress' action appears not
to have been driven by expediency.
In contrast, expediency had very much to do with President
Nixon's "stewardship" of the equal rights amendment. Graham's insightful discussion reveals that the Nixon White House's interest in
gender issues was spurred by Urban Affairs Council head Daniel Patrick Moynihan's recommendation that Nixon "take advantage of a
surging force that was ripe for creative leadership" (p. 400). The
White House responded by creating a Women's Task Force whose report (favoring E.R.A.-type solutions to gender inequality (p. 405)) languished until a coalition of prominent Republican women pressured
the White House (p. 406). The upshot of this was the White House
"fastening on any positive action it could safely take to rally the
aroused women's support" (p. 408), for example, supporting the
E.R.A.22
Expediency also plays a large role in Graham's account of the
Nixon administration's handling of voting rights. As part of his strategy to woo southern Democrats to the Republican party, Nixon unsuccessfully sought repeal of the 1965 Voting Rights Act requirement
that southern states "preclear" any electoral changes that would adversely affect minority interests.23. Nixon's efforts in voting rights also
reveal the close nexus between bureaucratic structure and civil rights
policy. In 1969, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department
was reorganized from sections corresponding to geographic regions to
sections organized by function. With respect to voting, the reorganization "'had the unanticipated consequence of producing an experienced team of attorneys dedicated to furthering [preclearance

objectives].' "24
22. Interestingly, the only Nixon official to oppose the E.R.A. vigorously was then Assistant
Attorney General William Rehnquist who viewed the overall effect of the amendment as " 'nothing less than the sharp reduction in importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination
of that unit by no means improbable.'" P. 408 (quoting Garment to Ehrlichman, Memorandum
for the President, May 25, 1970). Indeed, in congressional testimony recognizing that "'President Nixon and this Administration support the goal of establishing equal rights for women,' "
Rehnquist nonetheless argued against the propriety of the amendment. P. 417 (quoting H.R.J.
Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist)).
23. Pp. 356-60. The administrationalso sought to win favor in the South by highlighting the
hypocrisy of dual north-south standards. Noting that a higher percentage of minorities voted in
the South than in either New York or California, the administration sought a nationwide - as
opposed to a South-only - ban on literacy tests. Pp. 354-55.
24. P. 362 (quoting S. LAWSON, PURSUIT OF POWER 162-63 (1985) (emphasis added)).
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Voting is important for another reason. The preclearance provision in the 1965 Act, according to Graham, was the first "hint[] of a
radical shift from procedural to substantive criteria in civil rights law,
from intent to effect, from equal opportunity as a right to equality as a
fact and as a result" (p. 174). The story of this shift lies at the heart of
The Civil Rights Era. It is a story told by reference to executive fair
employment initiatives, antidiscrimination laws passed by Congress,
and agency initiatives.
A.

The Kennedy Years

The Kennedy era, despite Graham's meticulous one hundred-page
account, reveals surprisingly little about the shift from fair treatment
to just result objectives. "Insecure in his relations with Congress" (p.
65), Kennedy ducked an activist role in civil rights issues until his
hand was forced by racial violence in the South (p. 66). Indeed, Kennedy balked at including an antidiscrimination-in-employmentprovision in proposed federal civil rights legislation.25 The White House,
instead, endorsed a combination of voluntary efforts by private business (Plans for Progress), in which the administrationserved as cheerleader,26 and an interagency committee headed by Vice President
Johnson designed to ensure nondiscrimination in the awarding of federal grants. Without real authority over federal grants or loans, affected agencies subordinatedantidiscriminationobjectives to their own
interests in efficient procurement and "back-scratching mutuality"
with existing contractors (p. 44). As Graham notes, "the President's
unifying command and power" (p. 44) is prerequisiteto centralization
of otherwise diffuse agency interests. Without strong presidential
leadership, as the Kennedy experience reveals, department and agency
heads will view themselves as kings over their discrete domains.
The Kennedy years are revealing for another reason. The origins
of affirmativeaction can be traced to a Kennedy executive order requiring government contractors to take "affirmativeaction to ensure
that applicants [and]. . . employees are treated ... without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin."27 Graham is quick to
point out the irony that this "affirmativeaction" demand called for
nothing more than the fair treatment objective of eliminating discriminatory employment practices (pp. 34, 41). Indeed, when asked his
views of demands by black leaders for "job quotas by race," Kennedy
responded, "I don't think we can undo the past .... [While] the past
25. Pp. 95-99. Kennedy, however, did issue an executive order in November 1962 mandating nondiscrimination in federally assisted housing. See R. MORGAN, THE PRESIDENTAND
CIVILRIGHTS60-78 (1970).
26. Pp. 50-54. The administration ultimately withdrew its support for this voluntary approach in favor of more traditional compliance and enforcement. Id. at 54-59.
27. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1972 (1961).
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is going to be with us for a good many years ... [w]e have to do the
best we can now ....
I don't think quotas are a good idea."28
There were foreshadowingsof measures of numerical equality during the Kennedy years, however. The Labor Department, in responding to discrimination in apprenticeship training, proposed that
apprenticeshiplists "be disregardedto the extent necessary to provide
opportunities [for qualified minorities] ... for a significant number of
positions."29 Rescinded under intense union pressure, the labor action
seems a precursor to the race conscious apprenticeship training program approved fifteen years later by the Supreme Court in United
Steelworkers v. Weber.30 Graham also notes divisions among civil
rights leaders on the quota question (pp. 116-21), but he dismisses this
evidence, concluding that "the debate [during the Kennedy years] over
racial quotas elicited a virtually unanimous public condemnation of
the notion of racial preference" (p. 120).
B.

The Johnson and Nixon Administrations

A different saga is told concerning the Johnson administration
which, according to Graham, transformedthe goal of civil rights policy toward the achievement of numerical equality. This transformation involved both White House and agency initiated programs. That
this transformation occurred during the Johnson years is hardly surprising. Unlike Kennedy, Johnson cared passionately about racial
equality and made it a centerpiece of his administration.31
President Johnson's views are best revealed in a June 1965 speech
at Howard University. At this speech, Johnson exclaimed that "freedom is not enough" and that "the next and more profound stage of the
battle for civil rights ... [is] not just equality as a right and a theory
but equality as a fact and equality as a result."32 For Johnson, a remedy promising fair outcomes was the only way to "wipe away the scars
of centuries."33 This speech, in the eyes of Johnson official Joseph
Califano, demonstrates Johnson's "unabashed[] [support] for special
help and affirmativeaction."34 Graham, while more circumspect, rec28. PUB. PAPERS: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963, at 633-34 (1964) (Aug. 20, 1963 Press
Conference).
29. P. 115 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Labor press release, June 6, 1963).
30. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding voluntary one minority for one nonminority promotion
plan promulgated in response to pervasive union discrimination).
AMERICA230 (1981) (describing Johnson's commitment
31. See J. CALIFANO, GOVERNING
to civil rights as "passionate").
32. 2 PUB. PAPERS:LYNDONB. JOHNSON,1965, at 636 (1966).
33. Id. For Johnson, one mechanism of ensuring fair outcomes was the race-specificdesignation of certain political appointments. See, e.g., p. 226 (discussing Johnson's desire to replace
EEOC Commissioner Aileen Hernandez from a "list of Mexicans" preparedby John Connally).
34. J. CALIFANO, supra note 31, at 231.
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ognizes the speech to be a foreshadowing of a "crucial transition" (p.
174).
Ironically, the true precursorsto the shift to numerical equality are
two events soundly rooted in fair individual treatment objectives.
First, in a nonpolicy-driven reorganization of federal civil rights enforcement (p. 184), President Johnson entrusted with the Secretary of
Labor the responsibility to ensure that government contractors "as an
initial part of their bid" comply with the preexisting demand that "affirmative action" be taken to root out discrimination on the basis of
"race, creed, color, or national origin."35 Better known as Executive
Order 11,246, this reorganizationultimately set in motion the demand
for adequate minority representationamong federal contractors.36
Second, a White House team comprised of Robert Kennedy,
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Burke Marshall worked with Republican
Senator Everett Dirksen to assure passage of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and, with it, to create the EEOC. Graham convincingly shows that Title VII was designed both to avoid the imposition
of numerical hiring demands on employers and to limit the sweep of
EEOC power (pp. 125-52). Title VII provisions require proof of discriminatory intent,37prohibit the granting of "preferentialtreatment"
to attain racial balance,38and protect an employer's right to use professionally developed ability testing unless it was "designed, intended,
or used to discriminate."39The EEOC was denied the "cease and desist" powers of investigation, litigation, and adjudication typically associated with independent agencies. Instead, the EEOC's role was
limited to complaint-processingassociated with private enforcement.40
According to Graham, this limited role was pushed by Dirksen to protect employers from "harassment"by "a new mission agency like the
EEOC" (p. 146). Despite these structural and statutory limitations,
35. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). Executive Order 11,246 was typical
of the Johnson administration practice of using reorganizations to accomplish efficiency rather
than policy objectives. See E. REDFORD& M. BLISSETT,ORGANIZING
THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH107-41 (1981). For discussion of policymaking by way of reorganizationsee infra notes
180-82 and accompanying text.
36. Ironically, liberals at the time criticized Executive Order 11,246 for dissolving a White
House Coordinating Council chaired by Hubert Humphrey in favor of Labor Department enforcement. P. 188.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 706(g), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-5(g) (1988). In explaining this
provision, Hubert Humphrey noted that "the respondent must have intended to discriminate,"
and "inadvertentor accidental discrimination will not violate the title." 110 CONG.REC. 12724
(1964).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703(j), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(j) (1988).
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703(h), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(h) (1988). For further discussion, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
40. The Act also authorized the Department of Justice to file "pattern or practice" claims of
systematic discrimination, ? 707, and recognized broad authority in existing state fair employment agencies, ?? 706(c),(d), 709(b),(d).
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the EEOC emerges as the lead actor in pursuing numerical measures
of equality.
Surprisingly, while EEOC enforcement efforts and Executive Order 11,246 demands are rooted in the activist Johnson presidency, the
Nixon administration proved more than complicit in advancing these
Johnson initiatives. Graham's tale of the transformationof civil rights
policy from nondiscrimination to group rights, then, is a story of two
administrations. Indeed, as The Civil Rights Era amply demonstrates,
Nixon administrationefforts often proved as important as Johnson initiatives in cementing both EEOC efforts and the 11,246 program.
1. The EEOC
Graham's portrait of the EEOC, albeit incomplete,41is revealing
on several fronts. It shows that an agency's nascent stages play an
extraordinaryrole in shaping agency policy. Authorizing legislation is
often a tabula rasa to be fleshed out by the agency through its implementing regulations and interpretations. In the words of Alfred
Blumrosen, a key staffer during the EEOC's early years: "A new administrative agency has vast opportunities to demonstrate creative intelligence in its initial decisions. These decisions, made by a handful of
men and women who comprise the initial staff, reverberate through
time and space in a tidal wave of consequences for both procedureand
substance."42 With respect to the EEOC, Graham demonstrates that
the early years at the agency set in stone critical agency interpretations
of both its own authority and substantive Title VII law. These interpretations, moreover, are emblematic of early EEOC efforts to transform Title VII from what was - according to Jack Greenberg - a
"weak, cumbersome, [and] probably unworkable" set of provisions43
into the most powerful civil rights statute. Finally, although this point
is subject to question,44Graham concludes that White House indifference allowed the EEOC to be captured by the "increasingly militant
civil rights constituency."45
Graham's account also shows that the life of the law is its imple41. See infra note 44.
ANDTHELAW 51 (1971).
BLACKEMPLOYMENT
42. A. BLUMROSEN,
43. P. 189 (quoting Harwood, Battling Job Bias, Wall St. J., May 28, 1965, ? 1, at 1, col. 1).
44. Indeed, in many instances, the EEOC, not the NAACP, played the lead role in advancing broad-ranginginterpretationsof Title VII. For example, EEOC lawyers initiated the substitution of disparate impact standard for intent-based proofs. P. 250. In fact, one of the most
surprisingrevelations in Graham's account is early NAACP opposition to minority identification
in institutional records. Although the EEOC intended to monitor equal employment efforts aggressively through such identification, NAACP officials cautioned that "the minute you put race
on a civil service form, the minute you put a picture on an application form, you have opened the
door to discrimination." P. 199.
45. P. 157. This phenomenon - whether it be describedas "capture"or merely extraordinarily amicable relationshipsbetween the EEOC and its constituents - is revealed in EEOC efforts
to assist civil rights organizations in their litigation efforts. P. 244.
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mentation. Senator Dirksen's efforts to limit the EEOC's role statutorily to complaint-processing were subverted by artful interpretations
of Title VII. For example, statutory language disfavoring general recordkeeping requirementswas sidestepped by agency claims that state
data is too inexact to support systematic national monitoring (pp. 19397). This interpretationwas later characterizedby Alfred Blumrosen
as a creative reading of the statute "contrary to the plain meaning."46
A more striking example is the EEOC's filing of amicus briefs to express its substantive views on Title VII law despite Congress' explicit
prohibition of EEOC-initiated litigation.47 This enabled the EEOC to
argue in court that Title VII outlawed employer practices "'which
prove to have a demonstrableracial effect.' "48 The EEOC recognized
that its "constructive proof of discrimination" reading was at odds
with explicit statutory language and hence unlikely to receive judicial
approval.49 To the agency's and the civil rights community's delight
and surprise, in Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court validated
this broad reading.50
Implementation is a two-edged sword, however. Whereas EEOC
efforts to eradicate race discrimination reveal the power of aggressive
enforcement, early EEOC lack of interest in gender discrimination
made a mockery of this statutory prohibition. As Representative
Martha Griffiths observed in 1966, the EEOC was "'wringing its
hands about the sex provision'" so as not to "'interfere with the
46. P. 195 (quoting A. BLUMROSEN,
supra note 42, at 72). Before the EEOC put this broad
reading into effect, a meeting was arrangedto see whether Senator Dirksen would be troubled by
this breach of the legislative bargain. Dirksen said no, and the reporting system was put into
place. A. BLUMROSEN,
supra note 42, at 73.
47. See 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-4(gX6) (1988) (1972 Amendments granted EEOC authority to
intervene in civil actions brought against nongovernment respondents under Title VII; prior to
these amendments the EEOC was authorized only to refer matters to the Attorney General with
recommendations for the Attorney General either to intervene or to institute civil actions).
48. P. 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson, EEOC vs. Discrimination,Inc., THE CRISIS,
Jan. 1968, at 17). The argument's architect was Commission attorney Sonia Pressman. Recognizing both that her argument was a stretch and that some legitimate personnel decisions would
come under fire, Pressman advocated that the "active pursuit of an equal opportunity policy"
necessitated that blacks be "recruited, hired, transferred,and promoted in line with their ability
and numbers." P. 247 (quoting memo from Pressman to Duncan, May 31, 1966, at 8). This
revealing discussion of internal agency decisionmaking on this critical question is one of the
book's highlights. See also H. BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 45-46 (1991) (discussing similar argument advanced by EEOC staff

member Alfred Blumrosen).

49. According to Graham, the Commission's administrative history concluded that
"'[e]ventually this will call for reconsideration of the amendment [requiringproof of intent] by
Congress'... 'or the reconsiderationof [this broad] interpretationby the Commission.' " P. 250
(quoting EEOC administrative history).
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Interestingly, the EEOC thought the facts of Griggsfavored industry and hence recommended that the NAACP wait for a less vulnerable case. P. 385. This ex
parte dialogue between the EEOC and the NAACP is one more example of the identity of interest between the EEOC and the civil rights community.
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EEOC's 'main' business of eliminating racial discrimination.' "51 Graham's remarkable account of EEOC ambivalence about women-only
("Jane Crow") classified ads suggests an agency desire to disregard
initially at least - the sex discrimination prohibition altogether.52
Although the agency eventually outlawed single-sex ads in 1968 (p.
231), Graham's account of Jane Crow is a counterpoint to racial enforcement that ironically makes the same point about the right-defining nature of the implementation power.
In addition to the power of both early interpretation and implementation, a third key lesson is discernible from The Civil Rights Era:
the judiciary is a key player in the moder administrative state. Since
court action and not administrative enforcement governs Title VII, the
judicial branch plays a leading role in this area. Consequently, by deferring to early EEOC interpretations of Title VII, the Court enacted
EEOC's recreation of Title VII - a feat EEOC could not accomplish
on its own.
The courts' complicity is revealing in other ways. When Title VII
was amended in 1972, EEOC chair William Brown and former agency
official Alfred Blumrosen both preferred agency authority to initiate
litigation over the granting of "cease and desist" authority to the
agency. Brown characterized the agency as a civil rights advocate in
need of an activist forum - specifically, the judiciary.53 Blumrosen,
emphasizing the dangers of regulatory agencies becoming "captive" to
the regulated industry, argued that a weaker institutional framework
(one in which the agency did not have cease and desist authority) enables civil rights activists to use federal courts "'which are favorable
to their demands'" (p. 431). Ironically, as Graham describes it, the
Nixon administration favored judicial enforcement for exactly opposite reasons, namely, "the Republicans' vintage judicial strategy of
maximizing the role of adversary proceedings in court so as to minimize the judgmental discretion of New Dealish regulatory agencies."54
51. P. 225 (quoting 112 CONG.REC. 13693, 13694 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Griffiths)). For
further discussion of the tension between race and sex discrimination claims, see pp. 211-18.
52. The EEOC's November 1965 answer to the problem of sex segregated ads was to require
that advertisersindicate in the "Jobs of Interest-Female"column whether men were eligible and
vice-versa. P. 217. The EEOC reasoned that "'[c]ulture and mores, personal inclinations, and
physical limitations will operate to make many job categories primarily of interest to men or
women.'" P. 217 (quoting EEOC Chairman Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.). In April 1966, the
EEOC shockingly modified this weak policy to make it less burdensome on publishers. Pp. 21821.
By the end of the Johnson administration,however, "the EEOC seemed settled on a path that
would tightly link race and sex in EEO enforcement." P. 232.
53. Pp. 429-30. Brown flip-floppedon this matter and eventually came to endorse the more
traditional "cease and desist" model. P. 433.
54. Pp. 426-27. Curiously, with the sole exception of Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist,
the Nixon administration never raised doubts about the propriety of strengthening Title VII in
1972. For Rehnquist's observations, see pp. 424-25. Belz attributes Nixon's "uncritical"acceptance of judicial enforcement "notwithstanding the drastic revision of the law [through court
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The 1972 amendments, among other things, endorsed the judicial
enforcement model. They fortified the judiciary's leadership role in
the Title VII arena. As such, Congress denied itself some of the traditional tools of oversight (for example, confirmation, appropriations,
legislative veto) in shaping the development of Title VII. Congressional dissatisfaction with substantive judicial rulemaking, instead,
could only be expressed through statutory amendment.55 Graham,
although incorrectly presuming an activist judiciary predisposed to
furthering the interests of civil rights groups,56correctly characterizes
the EEOC model as a significant break from traditional regulatory
structures (pp. 469-70).
Graham's portrayal of the EEOC reinforces themes well known to
students of the modem administrative state: the identity of interests
between interest groups and agencies, the transient nature of original
legislative intent in the face of conflicting agency priorities, the sweep
of agency power in its early statutory constructions, policymaking by
way of resource prioritization, and the power of the judiciary to "codify" agency constructions. Graham's depiction also suggests that the
law as put into effect by an administrative agency may not be a law
that would receive prior congressional approval. Indeed, the Dirksen
compromise so central to Title VII's enactment stands in striking contrast to the Griggs-eraEEOC. Agency subversion of legislative purpose is only half of the story told by The Civil Rights Era; the other is
de facto presidential legislation by way of executive order.
2. Executive Order 11,246
The true embodiment of the shift from nondiscriminationto group
rights is Executive Order 11,246.57 Although numerical disparities
played a central role in EEOC enforcement, these disparities were
deemed a proxy for purposeful discrimination. In contrast, the numerical targets of Executive Order 11,246 are a requirement for contractors who do business with the federal government. Specifically,
the order demands an "acceptable" affirmative action program that
requires adequate "utilization of minorities and women, at all levels
and in all segments of [the] work force where deficiencies exist."58
opinion] that was then taking place" to Nixon's preoccupation with "opposing the grant of cease
and desist authority." H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 73.
55. During the period of Graham's study, this changed dynamic proved irrelevant, for
agency and oversight committee desires were furtheredby court interpretations. In recent years,
however, this judicial empowerment has proved the focal point of Title VII enforcement
controversies.
56. P. 470. Judicial activism in this area frequently came at the behest of the EEOC. While
the EEOC and civil rights groups shared the commonality of interests, there is no reason to think
that the courts were principally beholden to the civil rights community.
57. See supra note 35.
58. 41 C.F.R. ? 60-2.10 (1990). Executive Order 11,246 is implemented through regulations
known as Revised Order No. 4, which lists eight factors to determine whether there is minority
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The story of ExecutiveOrder11,246beginsin the finalmonthsof
labor
the Johnsonadministration.Troubledby raciallydiscriminatory
unionsthat effectivelycut off the supplyof minorityworkersto governmentcontractors,Departmentof Laborofficialsheld up contracts
in Philadelphiaand otherselectindustrialcities until contractorssubmitted pledgesto hire minorityworkers(p. 289). The GeneralAccounting Office, Congress' budgetarywatchdog, objected to this
maneuvering,however. Claiming that the failure to make such
pledgesdoes not invalidatelow bids,59the GAO arguedagainst" 'the
creationof a newsub-empirein the DOL withouta shadowof authorization.'"60 In response,the Labor Departmentrescindedthe soofficialsadcalledPhiladelphiaPlan. Indeed,Johnsonadministration
Contract
of
Federal
the
team
that
Office
transition
vised the Nixon
to
too
ineffective
was
operateindepenCompliancePrograms(OFCC)
dentlyand recommendedthat it be transferredfromLaborand folded
into the EEOC (p. 296).

the prospectsfor the
Withthe adventof the Nixon administration,
revitalizationof the PhiladelphiaPlan seemednonexistent.But revi- including
talizethe Planis preciselywhatthe Nixon administration
this
the Presidenthimself did. The "why"behind
surprisingNixon
initiativeis brilliantlytold by Graham.
Grahambegins by asking the obvious: "Why, then, did such a
man [who thought affirmativeaction 'simply would never do any
good' and]who wouldappealto southernand suburbanwhiteson the
busing issue ... begin his new administration by reviving the liberal
Democrats' explosively controversial Philadelphia Plan?" (p. 322).

Two factorsseemat workhere. First,Nixon LaborSecretaryGeorge
Shultz,afterEverettDirksen'scriticismsof the OFCCplacedhim in a
defensiveposture,decidedto respondaffirmativelyby strengthening
the OFCC rather than transferringit to the EEOC (pp. 324-25).
Shultz's solution was to revitalizethe PhiladelphiaPlan. Second,
PresidentNixon recognizedthat Shultz'ssuggestioncreateda "political dilemma"for the Democrats,namely,the divisionof two tradiunderutilization, including: (1) the minority population of the labor area surrounding the facility, (2) minority unemployment in the surrounding area, (3) availability of minorities with requisite skills, and (4) potential for training minorities in requisite skills. 41 C.F.R. ? 60-2.11
(1990). Employers who fail to comply with the order run the risk of losing vital government
contracts. This threat, of course, is extremely effective. As one contract compliance officer explained: "All that is needed is to take the employer to the cliff and say, 'Look over, baby.'"
Hearings on Equal Employment OpportunityProcedures,Senate Committeeof the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1969).
59. For an insightful summary of this issue, see Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study
in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 726-32 (1972).
60. P. 293 (quoting Melvin E. Miller to J. Edward Welch memo, Dec. 11, 1967). The GAO
- interested in establishing its final authority to review the legality of federal expenditures
argued that bidding requirementsmust be specific and definite. At this time, OFCC - fearing
Title VII's prohibition of preferential treatment - perceived it could not frame its affirmative
action demands in terms specific enough to satisfy the GAO. See p. 296.
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tionalDemocratconstituencies- laborunionsand civil rightsgroups
(p. 325). Grahamclaims Nixon's blatant opportunismhere is emblematicof Nixon's approachtowardssocial policy issues: "Lacking
any internallyconsistentmodelof civil rightstheory,the Administration was free to pursuecontradictorypoliciesfor short-termtactical
is disputable,61
Graham
gains"(p. 302). While this characterization
revealsa quite plausiblegroundworkfor this daringinitiative.
TheCivilRightsEra providesrevealinglooks at the sagaof Executive Order11,246,the EEOC,votingrights,and othercivil rightsinitiatives. In so doing, it providesinsightfulglimpsesinto both White
House managementof executivepolicymakingand congressional-executiverelations. Graham'sexaminationof a twelve-yearperiodalso
permitsexaminationof the role of the president'scivil rightsvision(or
lack thereof) in shapingnationalpolicy. Kennedy'stentativenessexJohnson'sassertiveplainsthe lack of progressin his administration;
ness points to the enactmentof significantlegislationin 1964, 1965,
and 1968as well as aggressiveadministrative
initiativesin the Department of Laborand the EEOC;Nixon's expediencypointsto compromise proposalson votingrightslegislationand Title VII amendments,
as well as apparentlycontradictorypositionson busingand Executive
Order11,246. Graham,finally,succeedsin offeringa historicalnarrative whichsuggestsa modelof the moder administrative
state- legislation principallydesigned by Congress and the White House,
interpretationand implementationby agencies,and court review of
agencyaction.62
Nonetheless,by limitinghis focusalmostentirelyto the enactment
of criticalpieces of legislationor the establishmentof White House
policy, Grahampays a heavy price. The White House's ability to
oversee agency implementationand, correlatively,agency relations
with interestgroupsand oversightcommittees,are hardlyexploredin
TheCivilRightsEra. Consequently,despiteGraham'sassertionthat a
principalfocus of the book is the "full policy cycle" with attendant
lessons about the White House's abilityto centralizecivil rights enforcement,the book falls shorton its promiseto examinethe full policy cycle.
The balanceof this reviewhelps fleshout Graham'scentralthesis
about bureaucraticstructuresand White House control. Part II, by
highlightingvariousfederalprogramsthat are an outgrowthof the
1960-1972era, but are not discussedin The CivilRightsEra, reveals
the enormoussweep of federalcivil rights enforcement,and with it,
the attendantdifficultyof centralization.PartIII furtherconsidersthe
61. See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
62. See also Blumrosen, The Crossroadsfor Equal Employment Opportunity:IncisiveAdministration or Indecisive Bureaucracy, 49 NOTREDAME L. REV. 46, 47-48 (1973) (proposing a
similar model for administrative implementation of equal employment opportunity policy).
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prospects of White House centralization by examining Reagan administration efforts in this area.
II.

1960-1972: THE STORYNOT TOLD

Graham's account of the civil rights era suggests that the shift
from individual to group concerns emerged during the latter stages of
the Johnson presidency and was solidified during the early Nixon
years. A strong argument can be made, however, that this transformation predates the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that it had fully taken
place prior to the promulgation of the first set of EEOC guidelines in
1966. In other words, the line separating equality of treatment from
equality of results was blurred from the start.63
From the early days of the Kennedy administration, civil rights
groups advocated race preferences.64 Indeed, while President Kennedy argued against "hard and fast quotas," he also advised employers
to "look over employment rolls, look over areas where we are hiring
people and at least make sure we are giving everyone a fair chance."65
The seeds of race preference, then, were planted before the 1964 Act.
With the establishment of the EEOC, civil rights advocates both inside
and outside of government argued for use of numerical proofs to show
discrimination. In August 1965, one month after the Commission formally came into existence, a White House Conference on employment
discrimination set the tone for EEOC policy.66 Participants included
civil rights groups, state fair employment commissions, employers,
and EEOC officials. As Herman Belz's review of the Conference transcript suggests, the conclusion reached - at least by EEOC officials was that "discrimination should be defined as patterns of social and
economic disadvantage caused by employment practices and social in63. Consequently, the Reagan administration'scall to return to mid-1960s "soft" affirmative
action techniques of recruitment and training is a bit of a misnomer. See Abram, Affirmative
Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV.L. REV. 1312 (1986). Indeed, reliance on
"hard" affirmativeaction techniques such as goals, quotas, and timetables is explainable in part
by the fact that no good alternatives to such "hard" devices were ever put into effect.
64. In 1961, a Chicago Urban League official told a congressional committee that "[w]hat we
need to be is positively color conscious." Hearings on Equal EmploymentOpportunity,Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 190
(1961) (statement of Edwin C. Berry, Executive Director, Chicago Urban League). In 1962, the
Congress of Racial Equality advocated the employment of a representativenumber of blacks and
that black candidates be preferredover equally qualifiedwhites. Equal EmploymentOpportunity:
Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and
Manpowerof the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 204-05, 22125 (1963); see also A. MEIER& E. RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDYIN THECIVILRIGHTSMOVEMENT 1942-1968, at 191-92, 232-35 (1973). See generally H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 7-41.
65. The President's News Conference of Aug. 20, 1963, reprintedin PUB. PAPERS:JOHNF.
KENNEDY,
1963, at 633-34. Graham's excerpt from this press conference deletes Kennedy's
suggestion that employers measure whether they are giving "everyone a fair chance" by
"look[ing] over employment rolls." See p. 106.
66. For a comprehensive- albeit biased - review of this Conference, see WhereCivil Rights
Law is Going Wrong,NATION'SBUS., Nov. 1965, at 60.
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stitutions in general" and consequently employers should "conduct racial surveys, generate and publicize profiles of under-representation
problems, and hire minorities."67 In its report on the Conference, the
Commission noted that with respect to preferential treatment "the
question was not whether we are meeting the letter of the law, as pertains to Title VII, but whether we are meeting the spirit of the law."68
The ultimate embodiment of this sensibility was the EEOC's August 1966 guidelines on employee selection procedures. Although the
1964 Act excludes from coverage "any professionallydeveloped ability
test ... not designed, intended or used to discriminate,"69the EEOC
guidelines, in preferring the "spirit" to the letter of the law, urged
employers to recruit minorities and demanded that job screening and
interviewing be undertaken by individuals fully committed to equal
employment opportunity.70 The guidelines, moreover, required statistical validation for any test that rejected blacks at a higher rate than
whites.71 The key to this aggressive agency posture was a dislike of
testing. Perceiving that cultural factors may affect performance on
many employment-relatedtests, the Commission argued that job performance and actual job requirements, not test scores, should be the
focus of hiring decisions.72 Indeed, in 1970, an agency official vowed
to fight "[t]he cult of credentialism ... in whatever form it occurs."73
The Civil Rights Era both gives short shrift to early EEOC initiatives and deemphasizes the significance of the early endorsement of
group rights by civil rights groups. As a result, Graham goes too far
in suggesting that, over time, the EEOC was captured by its clientele
interests.74 The truth, instead, is that the EEOC was an agency with a
mind of its own.75 Graham also errs in suggesting that forces of nature inexplicably coalesced in the latter stages of the Johnson presidency and, suddenly, civil rights enforcement was transformed from
its liberal individualistic base to a group rights approach. While their
67. H. BELZ,supra note 48, at 28-29.
68. See Where Civil Rights Law is Going Wrong,supra note 66, at 70.
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703(h), 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(h) (1988).
70. See Lyons, An Agency Witha Mind of Its Own: The EEOC's Guidelineson Employment
Testing, NEW PERSP.Fall 1985, at 20, 22; see also H. BELZ,supra note 48 at 116-18.
71. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 22.
72. See id. at 21-22.
73. See id. at 22 (quoting EEOC Chief Psychologist William Enneis).
74. In addition to the White House Conference and employee testing, EEOC recordkeeping
requirements support this claim.
75. This phrase derives from the title of Phil Lyons' article on EEOC testing. See Lyons,
supra note 70. In saying that the EEOC has a "mind of its own," I do not mean to suggest that
the EEOC operated in a vacuum. For example, key EEOC staff came from the civil rights community. This commonality helps explain the lead role that the EEOC played in advancing the
agenda of civil rights interest groups. However, the EEOC was not involuntarily "captured"by
these advocacy groups. This distinction is not merely semantic. A "captured" agency does not
determine its policy agenda; an agency that sees eye-to-eye with interest groups may well control
its policy agenda.
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potency increased over time, the use of numerical proofs seemed evident at the 1965 White House Conference. Ironically, the EEOC's
ability to disregard the delicate political compromise of 1964 lends
force to Graham's assertions of agency power. Consequently, these
criticisms suggest that Graham's arguments are even stronger than his
own presentation reveals.
Graham's history is also subject to attack for its selectivity. School
desegregation,the tax exempt status of private schools, and Nixon administration efforts to provide special assistance to minority entrepreneurs are hardly mentioned in this volume. This is unfortunate.
Aside from being three of the most significant issues of the 1960-1972
period,76these topics bear directly on several of The Civil Rights Era's
central concerns: the rise of numerical measures of equality, executive
policymaking without legislative authorization, and the rising significance of the dialogue between the judiciary and the elected branches.
Race and Education. The face of school desegregation was transformed from 1960 to 1972. In 1960, Brown v. Board of Education's77
impact was principally symbolic. Indeed, in the decade following
Brown, less actual desegregation of southern schools occurred than in
1965 alone.78 The implementation of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),79 coupled with the issuance and enforcement of guidelines for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
marked a significant shift in federal power over state education systems.80 Rather than playing a minimalist role in helping schools better educate their students, the federal government became a major
player in pushing schools to provide equal educational opportunity to
black children.
Surprisingly, Title VI, which prevents discriminatory institutions
from receiving federal dollars, was originally a mere bargainingchip in
76. Graham, of course, should not be expected to provide a detailed discussion of every civil
rights issue to emerge from 1960-1972. But he sets out as his objective the examination of bureaucratic structures and their impact on White House centralization. Cf pp. 5, 7-8. He can,
therefore, be criticized for failing to examine secondary topics that highlight the principal points
he makes about Title VII and Executive Order 11,246. Race and education, as well as minority
business enterprise, are such topics. In view of Graham's "full policy cycle" approach, see supra
note 14 and accompanying text, as the balance of this section makes clear, these topics are at
least as important as housing, the ERA, and Kennedy-era developments.
77. 347 U.S. 483, (1954).
78. For the 1965-1966 school year, the percentage of black children in biracial schools in the
11 southern states rose from 2% to 6%. See S. BAILEY& E. MOSHER,ESEA: THE OFFICEOF
A LAW 153 (1968); see also Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in
ADMINISTERS
EDUCATION
Education: The Meaning of Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1243, 1246-51 (1984).
79. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. ?? 2701-3386
(1988)).
80. With these enactments, the primary purpose of federal financial assistance for education
was no longer to help schools do better what they were already doing; rather, it was to remedy
their failure to provide equal educational opportunity to black children. See Hartle & Holland,
The Changing Context of Federal Education Aid, 15 EDUC.& URB. SOCY.408, 418-21 (1983).
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the package of civil rights legislation submitted to Congress.81 However, with Title VI's demand that federal grant recipients not discriminate, Congress became willing to pump billions of dollars of aid for the
compensatory education of educationally deprived children. (Indeed,
this conditioning of federal aid upon the nondiscriminatory status of
the aid recipient prompted strong resistance to ESEA by southern
members of Congress who were concerned that the money would be
used to force desegregation.) These billions of dollars were sufficient
incentive for many school systems to comply with the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) nondiscrimination standards.
The story of early enforcement of Title VI by the OCR parallels
EEOC efforts to strengthen Title VII: agency interpretationin tandem
with court action mandating change. As OCR read Title VI's legislative history, its requirements were consonant with current court rulings.82 As a result, it interpreted Title VI's desegregation
requirementsas being both flexible and potentially expansive. Regulations issued by OCR in December 1964 stated that districts would be
considered in compliance with Title VI if they were subject to a court
order or if they submitted a desegregation plan subsequently approved
by the Commissioner of Education.83 As judicial standards developed
calling for the immediate elimination of dual school systems, and as
the passage of ESEA in 1965 made Title VI enforcement in southern
school districts of particular concern to HEW officials, "a device for
gradual transition" was converted "into an engine of revolution."84
The initial Title VI guidelines, issued in 1965, requiredthe desegregation of all grades by 1967.85 In 1966, OCR issued revised guidelines
setting performance standards for desegregation in affected districts;
these guidelines also mandated faculty integration.86 The revised
guidelines set more rigorous standards for freedom of choice plans,
reflecting increasing concern that these plans were intended primarily
to maintain dual school systems, not dismantle them.87
The parallel between the OCR and the EEOC ends here. By the
third year of Title VI's enforcement, the resistance of state and local
81. See G. ORFIELD,THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF SOUTHERN
EDUCATION:THE SCHOOLS
AND THE 1964 CIVILRIGHTSACT 35, 39 (1969).
82. See id. at 43, 93.
83. 21 CONG.Q. ALMANAC568 (1965). See infra note 85.
84. G. ORFIELD,supra note 81, at 45.
85. See CONG.Q. ALMANAC,supra note 83, at 569. They specified that, at a minimum,
affected districts would have to desegregatefour grades (five in some instances) for the 1965-1966
academic year. Districts could demonstrate their compliance by filing an assurance of compliance (not acceptable for districts with continuing dual system practices), coming under a court
order, or filing an acceptable desegregation plan. See id.
86. See G. ORFIELD,supra note 81, at 146.
87. See id.; see also SENATESELECTCOMM.ONEQUALEDUCATIONAL
92D
OPPORTUNITY,
CONG., 2D SESS., TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONALOPPORTUNITY 196-97 (Comm. Print 1972).
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officials, as well as congressional restiveness over OCR's heightened
demands for desegregation, was strong enough to freeze the guidelines.
No changes were made for the 1967-1968 school year.88 At that time,
OCR requirements exceeded the requirements of federal court rulings
on school desegregation.89
In 1969, with the Nixon administration in office, both the executive and legislative branches increasingly opposed the federal courts
and the OCR on school desegregation questions.90 Increasing emphasis on numerical measures of equality by both the OCR (to measure
discrimination) and the courts (to remedy discrimination), as well as
mounting concern over the extension of desegregation to districts
outside the South and heightened opposition to busing, provoked a
political reaction ultimately resulting in the taming of federal school
desegregation enforcement efforts. Congress, with the President's
blessing, enacted legislation curbing the OCR's enforcement of Title
VI, particularly with regard to mandatory reassignments.91
This legislation reveals the obvious; that is, in a true battle between
elected government and bureaucratic administrators played out on a
statutory field, elected government will prevail.92 By emphasizing the
primacy of bureaucratic structures, The Civil Rights Era does not fully
recognize that Congress (through amending legislation or funding restrictions) and the Executive (through appointments) hold trump
cards in contests with renegade agencies.93 The manner in which this
88. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 258.
89. The OCR, for example, rejected freedom of choice plans prior to the Supreme Court's
Greendecision. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY,supra
note 87, at 197.
90. The Nixon administration, for example, sought to limit OCR enforcement both by
threatening not to withhold federal funds to ensure Title VI compliance and by instructing the
OCR - as well as the Department of Justice - that "they are to work with individual school
districts to hold busing to the minimum required by law." Naughton, Nixon DisavowsH.E. W
Proposal on School Busing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at A15, col. 3.
91. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960s, the efforts of the federal government had dramatically eroded southern school segregation. For example, between 1963 and 1968, the percentage
of black children in all-black schools in the South dropped from 98% to 25%. G. ORFIELD,
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 5 (1983).
92. Interestingly, when OCR enforcement waned, civil rights plaintiffs went to court claiming OCR enforcement inconsistent with Title VI demands. This lawsuit, Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), was the first step in the judiciary's "capture" of the OCR. As
described by Jeremy Rabkin: "Launched in 1970, the case was still generating new briefs and
new judicial orders at the end of the 1980s, having expanded by then to encompass every facet of
the enforcement responsibilities of the defendant agency." J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS

147 (1989). For a more extensive discussion of this legislation's effect on the OCR, see generally
id. at 147-81. For an analysis of the related issue of whether the executive can sign onto a
consent decree which limits the policy discretion of successor administrations, see Rabkin &
Devins, Averting Governmentby Consent Decrees: ConstitutionalLimits on the Enforcement of
Settlements with the Federal Government,40 STAN.L. REV. 203 (1987).
93. The all-importantdialogue which takes place between agencies and oversight committees
is strikingly absent from The Civil Rights Era.
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trump is (or is not) exercised is an important matter not addressed by
Graham.
The OCR experience is revealing in quite another way. Despite its
overt reliance on numerical proofs, the EEOC was not subject to the
same limitations as the OCR during this period, for Title VII - unlike
Title VI - was enforced through the courts by private parties. In
other words, since the EEOC did not directly enforce its interpretations of Title VII, the structural relationship between the courts, the
elected branches, and the agency was different here than with the
OCR. Where the OCR - like most federal offices - is especially
vulnerable to presidential appointments and congressional funding,
the judicial enforcement model of the EEOC provides an important
layer of insulation between Title VII and elected government.94 The
Civil Rights Era recognizes this critical distinction (pp. 469-70); but,
by failing to compare the EEOC to other enforcement agencies, Graham's work is inadequate to the task of explaining the relationship
between bureaucratic structure and agency performance.
Federal equal educational opportunity enforcement also can be
contrasted to Title VII enforcement with respect to the related question of tax exemptions for racially discriminatoryprivate schools. Segregated private schools, sometimes aided by state subsidies,
significantly impeded the achievement of nondiscriminationobjectives
in education during the 1960-1972 period (and in the present day).95
From 1966 to 1972, enrollment in segregated private schools in districts subject to desegregation orders rose from 25,000 to 535,000.96
Yet before 1970, federal enforcement efforts were generally limited to
the Title VI prohibition of direct financial assistance to discriminatory
private schools.97
The rise of segregated private schools contributed to the racial
stratification of public education by removing white children from
public school systems. Making matters worse, the IRS indirectly supported this undermining of public school desegregation through tax
breaks to segregated schools.98 Consequently, in 1967, the U.S. Civil
94. Another difference is that EEOC enforcement is, for the most part, a factor worked into
the initial hiring decision. The EEOC influence then affects a limited number of people in an
undetectable way. In contrast, the busing issue is extraordinarilyvisible and raises concerns that
affect everyone, namely, the safety and schooling of children.
95. See Chemerinsky, The Constitutionand Private Schools, in PUBLICVALUES,PRIVATE
274 (N. Devins ed. 1989).
SCHOOLS
96. See Note, Segregation Academics and State Action, 82 YALEL.J. 1436, 1441 (1973).
97. One exception to this was a 1967 IRS rule that tax exemptions be denied to schools
whose operations violate the laws of the United States. I.R.S. News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) ? 6734. This nondiscrimination policy was of
limited value, however. Its application extended only to private schools that had contracted with
the Army to teach the children of Army personnel.
98. For competing views on the impact of such tax breaks on public school desegregation,
compare Chemerinsky, supra note 95 with Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation
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Rights Commission urged the Johnson IRS to deny tax breaks to any
private school practicing racial discrimination.99The Johnson administration, however, concluded that the IRS was without legal authority
to deny tax exemptions, reasoning that the discriminatoryadmissions
practices of private schools violated no law.?00
The Johnson administration'sdecision here is puzzling. Although
the Internal Revenue Code does not specify nondiscrimination as a
condition of federal tax exempt status, its tax exemption provision
arguably mandates nondiscrimination through its use of the word
"charitable";Title VI's nondiscrimination mandate arguably extends
to both direct and indirect support;and the Constitution arguablyprohibits indirect governmental support of private discrimination.101Indeed, since the IRS demand would be one of simple
nondiscrimination, the Johnson IRS position seems somewhat
surprising.

The likely explanation for the surface variations in practices of the
EEOC and the IRS is that the two agencies serve differentconstituencies. The EEOC, as Graham demonstrates, sees itself as a civil rights
advocate. As such, it is predisposed to expand its statutory mandate
to serve this higher objective. The IRS, in contrast, does not serve this
constituency and hence is unlikely to place civil rights concerns ahead
of its interest in effective administration. In fact, by denying reform
efforts initiated by political factions, the IRS insulates itself from interest group politics and hence improves its ability to reign over the Tax
Code. The potentially conflicting objectives of the IRS and the EEOC
support Graham's assertion that White House centralization of civil
rights enforcement is a difficult task.'02 Civil rights enforcement cuts
across all federal agencies. Not surprisingly, each agency will value
civil rights objectives in light of its other priorities. Consequently, centralization in civil rights enforcement demands that the White House
play an extremely aggressive role - making civil rights a priority at
the expense of other policy objectives. The Civil Rights Era barely
hints at this critical attribute of civil rights enforcement.
The private school tax exemption issue also lends important support to Graham's assertion that from 1960-1972 the judiciary emerged
of Private Education by the Internal Revenue Service, in PUBLICVALUES,PRIVATESCHOOLS,
supra note 95, at 133.
SCHOOL
1966-67, at 99DESEGREGATION,
99. U.S. COMMN.ON CIV. RIGHTS,SOUTHERN
100 (1967).
100. See Rabkin supra note 98, at 139.
101. For a summary of statutory and constitutional arguments on this matter, see Galvin &
Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND.L. REV. 1353,
1368 (1983).
102. Furthermore,like the EEOC, the OCR was aligned with the civil rights community and
hence took an aggressive approach in interpreting its Title VI authority. Unlike Title VII enforcement, however, public opposition to expansive school desegregationorders ultimately led to
the curtailment of OCR power. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
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as a key playerin the administrativestate. Unlikejudicial enforcement of Title VII, which assistedthe EEOCin its effortsto liberalize
Title VII, the courtsplayedthe lead role in reversingthe IRS' extension of tax breaksto discriminatoryschools.103In 1969, ratherthan
seek legislativereversalof the IRS policy throughstatutoryamendment,the LawyersCommitteefor CivilRightsfiledsuit, raisingstatutory and constitutionalobjectionsto the IRS policy. This strategy
paidoff. Aftera preliminaryinjunctionwas issuedagainstthe Service,
the government- reportedlyafterhigh level discussionsin the White
House104- reversedits position and announcedthat it could "no
longer legally justify allowing tax-exemptstatus to private schools
which practiceracialdiscrimination.... 105
This concession,too, seemssurprising.After all, the preservation
of the statusquo at the IRS was implicitin Nixon'sSouthernStrategy
opposingschool desegregationremedies. Yet, after denouncingthe
new IRS policy,southernersbeganto see the "logic"of the Nixon IRS
action. Following a meeting with IRS CommissionerRandolph
Thrower,MississippiRepublicanParty ChairmanClark Reed perceivedthe IRS announcementas merelysymbolic;he announcedthat
"[i]fThrowersticksto his wordand is sincerein takingactiononly to
offsetmoreextremecourt action,no privateschool... I know of...
will be withouttax exemptstatusfor a single day."106
This episodereveals,in starkerform than anythingdiscussedby
Graham,the potentialreach of judicial authorityin the shapingof
civil rightsadministration.That the courtsshould,as SkellyWright
put it, fill in the voids where "the elected branchesof government
shouldhave acted and failed"107
portendsa type of judicialoversight
of agencydecisionmakingthat may well exceedtraditionallegislative
oversight. The privateschool tax exemptionaffairis proofpositiveof
this new judicialrole.
Although Graham pays limited attention to Nixon's Southern
Strategy,neitherthe OCR nor the IRS emergesas an actor in The
CivilRights Era. Their experiences,however,are revealingboth as
separatetalesof civil rightsenforcementand as partof a largermosaic
of federalcivil rightsenforcement.Indeed,with respectto Graham's
103. See generally McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adversenessin Challenges of Tax Exemptions for DiscriminatoryPrivate Schools, 52 FORDHAML. REV. 441 (1984) (chronicling court's
disregard of standing, adverseness, and mootness in federal tax exemption litigation).
104. Indeed, the White House went out of its way to signal President Nixon's personal involvement in the decision. See D. WHITMAN,RONALDREAGANAND TAX-EXEMPTIONS FOR
RACIST SCHOOLS (1984) (Kennedy School of Government Study).
105. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, reprintedin 1970 Stan. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ? 6790.
106. Reed, Both Sides in South Mistrust Nixon Action on School Integration, N.Y. Times,
July 16, 1970, at A22, col. 1.
107. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 34. Wright limits this activism to the "area of equal rights for
disadvantaged minorities." Id.
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larger concerns of assessing both White House centralization efforts
and the advent of the judiciary as a key player in the administrative
state, race and education issues seem at least as important to The Civil
Rights Era as housing, the equal rights amendment, and quite possibly
voting rights.
Minority Business Enterprise. The Civil Rights Era is strangely
mute on various Nixon initiatives to encourage minority business enterprise through explicit race preferences.108 These programs demonstrate that Executive Order 11,246 was not a fluke. The Nixon
administration, rather than seek political advantage through endorsement of a single affirmative action plan, was solidly in the corner of
race preferences. This commitment to race preferences reinforces
Graham's assertion that group rights concerns had by 1972 trumped
equality of opportunity concerns - an assertion, incidentally, that
grounds Graham's explanation as to why 1960-1972 is an appropriate
period to study. Indeed, since numerical proofs of discrimination utilized in Title VII and voting can be characterized as measurements of
purposeful discrimination,109 and since Executive Order 11,246 - according to Graham's account - seems a political anomaly, some discussion of minority business enterprises seems necessary to make
airtight Graham's group rights claim.
In 1953, Congress created the Small Business Administration
(SBA), an agency which by contracting - under its section 8(a) authority - with government agencies to set aside work for SBA-designated small businesses"? ensured the award of government contracts
to small businesses. At that time, the focus of SBA section 8(a) efforts
was race-neutral economic development. With Congress' enactment
in 1967 of legislation designed to assist economically disadvantaged
small business,"' the SBA set-aside program began to change focus.
In June 1969, the SBA had created an Office of Business Development
to "deal with the complex problems involved in effectively using the
authority of section 8(a).""2 In November 1970, SBA regulations
108. Graham's discussion is limited to a brief two-page discussion of the Office of Minority
Business Enterprises. Pp. 314-16.
109. Proponents of numerical proofs of discrimination claim that the inadequacy of the intent standard as an accurate gauge of discrimination necessitates the use of numerical measures.
See, e.g., Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
110. 15 U.S.C. ? 637a (1982). My discussion of the Small Business Administration draws
heavily from P. Lyons, The Small Business Administration's Section 8(a) Set-Aside Program
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author). See also Levinson, A Study of Preferential
Treatment: The Evolution of Minority Business EnterpriseAssistancePrograms,49 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 61 (1980).
111. Small Bus. Act Amends. of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-104, 81 Stat. 268 (1967).
112. Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Set-Asides and 8(a) Subcontracts: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on GovernmentProcurementof the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970) (statement of Edward N. Odell, Acting Deputy Director, Office of
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specified program eligibility to firms owned by "socially or economically disadvantaged persons," that is, a category of owners of firms
that "includes, but is not restricted to, Black Americans, American
Indians, Spanish Americans, Oriental Americans, Eskimos and
Aleuts."'13 Although these criteria technically did not prohibit
nonminority participation in the 8(a) program, a 1978 SBA report indicated that ninety-six percent of 8(a) participants were minorityowned firms.114
This minority specification was rooted in a rather creative reading
of the 1967 statute. The SBA assumed that, by referring to "low
income" individuals in the statute, Congress' concern was not simply economic disadvantage but also social disadvantage. In addition, the SBA assumed, as SBA head Thomas Kleppe put it, that
"'minority' is a shorthand for the phrase 'socially or economically
disadvantaged.' "115

This feat of statutory construction, which certainly matches EEOC
interpretationsof Title VII in audacity, was encouraged by the White
House. Between March 1969 and October 1971, President Nixon issued three executive orders to "help establish and promote minority
business." The creation of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise"16within the Department of Commerce and the call for increased representation of "Minority Business Enterprises" within
federal departments and agencies17 were the byproduct of these executive orders. Moreover, in 1971, a President's Advisory Council Report advocated that minorities be provided "a substantially increased
stake in the American economy,"118for "[t]he unique historical experience of... disadvantaged minorities ... cannot be ignored in shaping a national effort to produce substantial new entrepreneurial
activity.""9 The Nixon administration then, as Phil Lyons puts it,
was "determinedto act on its conviction that some groups in our sociBusiness Development, Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C., accompanied by Clifford J. Hawley, District Director, Small Business Administration, Albuquerque, New Mexico).
113. 13 C.F.R. ? 124-8.1(c) (1971).
114. ? 8(A) REVIEW BOARD, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONSON THE SECTION 8(A) PROGRAM FOR A. VERNON WEAVER, ADMINISTRATOR,

SBA 23 (1978); see also Levinson, supra note 110, at 66.
115. GovernmentMinority Small Business Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minority Small Business Enterpriseof the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1971) [hereinafterSmall Business Hearings] (testimony of Thomas S. Kleppe, Administrator, Small Business Administration, accompanied by John A. Knebel, General Counsel, and
Arthur McZier, Assistant Administrator for Minority Enterprise).
116. Exec. Order No. 11,458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969); see also Exec. Order No. 11,625, 3
C.F.R. 616 (1971) (authorizing OMBE to provide financial assistance to organizations "so that
they may render technical and management assistance to minority business enterprises").
117. Exec. Order No. 11,518, 3 C.F.R. 907 (1970).
118. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, MINORITY
ENTERPRISE AND EXPANDED OWNERSHIP: BLUEPRINT FOR THE 70S 5 (1971).

119. Id. at 10.
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ety, due to no fault of their own, had not enjoyed economic progress in
comparison to other groups."120
In 1971, efforts to curtail the SBA program were launched in Congress and the courts. Senate and House oversight committees both
heard that the minority designation was without statutory authorization.121 Yet, perhaps because committee members were sympathetic
to the SBA section 8(a) program,122little real pressure was placed on
the SBA and, in 1978, Congress codified the section 8(a) program.'23
In court, a constitutional reverse discrimination challenge ultimately
failed because of plaintiffs' lack of standing.124
The SBA section 8(a) program and minority business enterprise
executive orders are revealing on several fronts. First, the Nixon administration'scommitment to these programs demonstratesthe prevalence of the group rights approach in the early 1970s. Although the
Nixon administration's full throttle commitment to increasing both
minority enterprise and minority employment suggests - contrary to
Graham - that Nixon's support of civil rights was more real than
superficial,125Graham's thesis regarding the dominance of group
rights concerns ultimately would benefit from a more forceful presentation of the solidification of affirmativeaction largesse in the Nixon
era. Second, the explicit designation of groups other than blacks as
program beneficiaries is a development of extraordinary significance.
Politically, broadening the base of the beneficiaries proved critical to
the near deferential approach of oversight committees to the section
8(a) program. Yet over time, this legitimation of a racial spoils system
led to vigorous battles between in and out groups over their fair share
of this government pie.126 This ancillary phenomenon exemplifies the
shift to group rights, for these battles made mockeries of both the
120. P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 27.
121. See Small Business Hearings, supra note 115, at 35 (Rep. Robinson's criticism of the
AND OPEN
ON FEDERALSPENDINGPRACTICES
minority designation); SENATESUBCOMM.
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT BASED ON HEARINGS AND INQUIRIES CONDUCTED ON THE SBA INVOLVING ABUSES IN THE 8(A) PROGRAM 4

(Comm. Print 1978) (" 'Social or economic disadvantage'is a phrase initiated by SBA's Office of
General Counsel to step around the constitutional questions raised by the 8(a) program.")
122. Cf P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 30-33 (discussing committee members' advocacy of
minority interests).
123. Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757-73 (1978). For further discussion, see Levinson, supra
note 110, at 84-94.
124. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 709-10 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). At the district court level, however, plaintiffs prevailed on the
merits. 334 F. Supp. 194 (1971).
125. See also H. BELZ,supra note 48, at 35 (Nixon pressed employment equality in Eisenhower administration),at 38-39 (Philadelphia Plan support rooted in belief in minority economic
development), at 94-95 (SBA 8(a) program).
126. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 42,832 (1979) (granting presumptive disadvantaged status to
Asian-Pacific Americans) with 45 Fed. Reg. 25,563 (1980) (denying presumptive status to
Hasidic Jews).
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ethos of individualism (which views as morally offensive the treatment
of individuals as members of a group) and of remedial principles
(which would draw sharp lines between blacks and other minority
groups based on differing degrees of discrimination suffered at the
hands of government). Third, an agency's ability to use its authorizing
statute as a creative license is well-illustratedin SBA interpretationsof
its section 8(a) authority. This story reinforces Graham's central lesson about the EEOC. Fourth, although not as dramatic or significant
as Executive Order 11,246, presidential executive order power is also
illustrated here. Fifth and finally, the role of the courts and legislative
oversight committees is again revealed here. That the challenges
sought to limit group rights decisionmaking and that the challenges
failed also point to the solidification of the group rights approach.
*

*

*

Minority business enterprise, race and education, and employment
testing strengthen Graham's central contentions about the ascendancy
of group rights and the ability of agencies to transform legislative priorities. These issues also are instructive in stating the complex interchange that takes place between the agency, interest groups, the
White House, and Congress. The Civil Rights Era, with its "full policy
cycle" emphasis, would have been well served by the inclusion of these
topics.
III.

REAGAN

CIVIL RIGHTS

AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY

OF WHITE

HOUSE CENTRALIZATION

The explicit and implicit conclusions of The Civil Rights Era suggest an enfeebled presidency. Graham gives several reasons for this.
First, the "full policy cycle" reveals that career bureaucrats,not political appointees, ultimately hold the key in the running of government
agencies (p. 7). Second, triangular power relationships that form
among an agency, its legislative oversight committee, and its constituent interests effectively foreclose active White House involvement in
the running of government (p. 470). Third, to the extent that agencies
disregard constituent interests, the judiciary will likely impose these
constituent desires on agencies (p. 470). Fourth, agency power is at its
apex immediately after the enactment of legislation. During this period, agency statutory interpretations - validated by court opinions
- shape the meaning of legislation into a form acceptable to the
agency.127 Correlatively, although Graham does not make this point,
agencies are circumscribed in their ability to "recreate" their legislative mandate once court opinions cement agency constructions. In
other words, a White House that inherits a preexisting enforcement
scheme has rather limited options.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53.

1750

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1723

Graham'sproof of these propositionsis wanting. Furthermore,
some of these propositionsare suspect. While it is indisputablethat
careeristattorneysin both the Justice Departmentand the EEOC
helped shape agencypolicy, there is no reasonto suspectthat these
policy directionswere not in accordwith the desiresof politicalappointees. In fact, the Nixon and Johnsonadministrations'
supportof
sweepingcivil rightsinitiativessuggestsjust the opposite. Moreover,
even if careeristsunilaterallyshapedpolicyin the Nixon and Johnson
years,thatdoesnot meanthata presidentideologicallyopposedto this
careeristvisioncould not retoolthe agencyto suit his priorities.For
example,PresidentReagansought to undertakesuch a retoolingin
severalgovernmentagencies.
Graham'sfailureto discussrelationshipsbetweenoversightcommitteesand eitheragenciesor interestgroupsis also problematicbecause it makeshis assertionabout "irontriangles"pure speculation.
Moreover,the mere potentialthat such triangularrelationshipsmay
form does not mean that that potentialwill be realized. During the
Reaganyears,for example,relationshipsbetweenagencies,on the one
on the other
andinterestgroups129,
hand,andoversightcommittees128
hand,wereoftentesty. Finally,althoughthe courtsoftenimposeconstituentviewson agencies,courts- at least duringthe Reaganyears

-

sometimes prefer the White House's view.130

These criticismsof Graham'sproof do not mean that Graham's
ultimateconclusionsaboutthe difficultiesof WhiteHouse centralizaintion are in error. Earlyagencyinterpretations
are extraordinarily
careerists
do
remain
after
a
term
is
fluential,
president's
complete,
courtsdo orderagenciesto complywith constituentinterestsclaims,
and oversightcommitteesdo exert tremendouspower over agencies.
In additionto the vast arrayof federalprogramsand agenciesin need
of coordination,thesephenomenastandas roadblocksto WhiteHouse
centralizationefforts. These roadblocks,however,do not foreclose
White House influences;instead, they deny presidentialsupremacy
and forcethe administrationto supplementtraditionalpolicymakingwith such backdoor policymakingdevicesas apthrough-rulemaking
pointments, agency reorganization and policy prioritization.'31
Although such policymakingdevices are necessarilytransitory(for
subsequentadministrationscan exercisethe powersof appointment,
128. See infra notes 160, 162, 174-79, 187 and accompanying text.
129. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
130. Compare Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 AffirmativeAction Cases: It's All Over but the
Shouting, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 524 (1987) (Reagan Department of Justice attack on affirmative
action soundly defeated by Supreme Court) with Devins, AffirmativeAction After Reagan, 68
Texas L. Rev. 353, 378 (1989) ("[V]iewed as a mosaic, the cases leave unanswered many questions about the scope of permissible affirmativeaction.").
131. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
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policy prioritization, and reorganizationto displace their predecessor's
objectives), they play quite a large role in civil rights enforcement.
The reaches and limits of White House civil rights efforts can be
seen in Reagan's efforts to centralize civil rights policy. Reagan took
office at the height of federal efforts to impose numerical measures of
equality. During the Carter years, existing programs, such as Executive Order 11,246 and section 8(a), were strengthened132and numerous race- and gender-conscious initiatives were launched throughout
federal departmentsand agencies.133Reagan made opposition to these
Carter initiatives a centerpiece of his campaign, arguing that "equal
opportunity should not be jeopardized by bureaucraticregulations and
decisions which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirementsto
exclude some individuals in favor of others, thereby rendering such
regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory."134
The manner in which Reagan sought to effect change is also significant. In addition to the appointment of like-minded individuals,'35
Reagan intended to reestablishthe White House as the locus of federal
power. Almost immediately after assuming office, Reagan formed a
Task Force on Regulatory Relief.36 The byproduct of this task force
was the creation of an entity within the White House, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), to screen all agency
rulemaking.137The Reagan White House then appeared ready, will132. See P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 46-52 (discussing 8(a) program under Carter); Clark,
Affirmative Action May Fall Victim to Reagan's Regulatory Reform Drive, NATL. J., July 11,
1981, at 1248, 1250.
133. See generally Finn, "AffirmativeAction" Under Reagan, COMMENTARY,Apr. 1982, at
17, 18-20. Carter initiatives included efforts to demand adequate minority student representation
in tax-exempt private schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978); the granting of preferencesto minority broadcasters, Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C. 2d 979 (1978); the establishment of a minority business enterprise set aside for Department of Transportation highway programs, Department of Transportation Order No. 4000.7A,
43 Fed. Reg. 20, 883 (1978); and the EEOC's 1978 Uniform Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295
(1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 38,312 (1978).
134. 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in 36 CONG.Q. ALMANAC50-B, 62-B (1980).
Compare 1980 Democratic Platform, reprintedin 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 91-B, 105-B ("[A]n effective affirmative action program is an essential component of our commitment to expanding
civil rights protections."). Reagan, moreover, did not change his rhetoric once in office.
135. The Reagan administrationmade commitment to an antiregulatoryagenda, rather than
substantive expertise in the relevant program, the critical prerequisiteto presidentialnomination.
See G. EADS & M. Fix, RELIEFOR REFORM?:REAGAN'SREGULATORY
DILEMMA140-46
(1984). The consequence of this strategy was that Congress failed to support regulatory reform
efforts requiring the granting of discretion in program heads. Id. at 146-48.
136. White House Report, Program for Economic Recovery, 17 WEEKLYCOMP.PRES.
Doc. 138, 151 (Feb. 18, 1981).
137. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 12 (1982). For competing perspectiveson this executive order, compare Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of
Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981) (executive
order unconstitutionally subverts Congress' legislative primacy) with Demuth & Ginsberg, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (defending executive order). Interestingly, Congress threatened to cut off federal funding of OIRA due to the
overpoliticization of the review process. See Havermann, 'Defunding'O.M.B.'s Rule Reviewers,
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ing, and able to tackle the Carter legacy of expansive race-conscious
programs and regulations.
Once in office, however, the Reagan Administration's pursuit of its
equal opportunity platform proved far from clear. This lack of clarity
evidences real limits in White House centralization efforts. Curiously,
one of the best demonstrations that the president is powerful but not
omnipotent is that Reagan civil rights policy came under attack from
both the left and the right. From the right, Jeremy Rabkin, pointing
to the administration's support of numerous affirmative action programs, accused the Reagan administration of "wring[ing] what[ever]
partisan advantage it can from the pattern of racial and ethnic spoils
established in the 1970s."138 Chester E. Finn, Jr., put the matter more
succinctly when he observed that "[t]he most ideological administration in recent history seems not to have its ideas sorted out"; instead
Reagan civil rights policy depended "more than it should on what day
it is, who is in charge of a particular decision, what constituency is
raising the loudest ruckus, and which agency is responsible for formulating the alternatives and executing the decision."139
Criticism did not come only from the right. Indeed, the Reagan
administration has been savaged by the left. Norman Amaker concludes that the Reagan civil rights record "reflects an energizing, conThat view is one that eschews any
sistent philosophical view ....
attention to the historical roots of race and sex discrimination ... [but
focuses instead] on the present intent of alleged discriminatory conduct."'40 Correlatively, during the Reagan years, the civil rights community issued numerous reports condemning the administration. The
liberal attacks targeted Reagan's opposition to voting rights reform
and the Civil Rights Restoration Act; Reagan's attempts to grant tax
breaks to discriminatory private schools and to reconstitute the Civil
Rights Commission in his own image; appointees to the Federal Communications Commission, Department of Education, and EEOC who
questioned the Carter legacy; and - most important - the granting
of carte blanche authority to the Department of Justice to launch a
frontal assault on numerical measures of equality.141
The Reagan administration's mixed record, while inviting criticism
Wash. Post, July 18, 1986, at A17, col. 1. After this threat, OIRA agreed to modify its review
procedures.
138. Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 5, 1985, at 15, 17. Specifically,
Rabkin pointed to Department of Labor enforcement of Executive Order 11,246, the Department of Education's use of numerical proofs of discrimination, the EEOC's demand that federal
agencies maintain affirmativeaction hiring plans, and minority business enterprise programs in
the Small Business Administration as well as the Department of Commerce.
139. Finn, supra note 133, at 28.
140. N. AMAKER,supra note 10, at 161.
141. See generally LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITHOUT JUSTICE 75
(1982); WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS: THE FIRST TWENTY
MONTHS 5-6 (1982); Finn, supra note 133, at 17.
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from both sides, seems inevitable. First, federalcivil rights enforcement sweepsthroughoutthe executivebranch;hence, effectiveWhite
House coordinationis almost impossible. Unless a presidentmakes
civil rightsenforcementthe benchmarkof his administration,
discontinuityseemsunavoidable.Second,once a law is enactedandthe initial
difficultto
implementingregulationspromulgated,it is extraordinarily
reconsideren massethe enforcementschemesof prioradministrations.
Oversightcommitteeand constituencyinterestoppositionis simply
too formidablehere. Consequently,secondarydevicessuch as reorganizationand policy prioritization- which do not directlyattack
existingregulations- are often the best mechanismfor changeavailable to the White House. Third,relianceon such secondarydevices
limits a president'scivil rightslegacy. Successoradministrationscan
easilyresetprioritiesand reorganizeagencies. The Reaganexperience
supportseachof thesepropositionsandhencerevealsthe inherentlimits of WhiteHousecentralization.The balanceof this sectionwill consider these three matters in turn, portraying Graham's central
assertionsaboutthe difficultyof White House centralization,the imand the powerof otherplayersportof earlyagencyinterpretations,
courts,oversightcommittees,and interestgroups- as truismsof the
moder presidency.
The Improbability of Centralization. Every government agency,

department,and commissionis in the businessof civil rightsenforcement. Title VI requirementsare enforcedby all governmentagencies
EEOCregulationscall for sensitivityby
distributingfederallargess;142
all governmentagenciesto numericalequalityobjectivesin their own
hiring.143Moreover,freestandingcivil rightsenforcementprojectsexist withinthe EEOC,SBA, FCC,CivilRightsCommission(CRC),the
Legal ServicesCorporation(LSC),and the Departmentsof Treasury,
Labor,Education,Commerce,Transportation,and Justice.'44Given
the pervasivenessof civil rightsenforcement,centralizationcan occur
only if the WhiteHouseboth makescoordinationa primaryobjective
and is extremelydiligentin appointingto key governmentposts individualswho agree with the president'sviews on civil rights enforcement. Otherwise, competing regulatory agenda items will take
precedenceover civil rights enforcementand, correlatively,external
142. Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 602, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000d-I (1982).
143. "EEOC had cited ? 717(B)(1) of Title VII and Executive Order 11,748 as requiring
Federal agency equal employment opportunity plans, including affirmative action goals, to be
reviewed and evaluated by EEOC." 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at n. 313 (citing Clarence
Thomas, speech before NASA Equal Opportunity Council Meeting, Hampton, Va. 10-11 (May

26, 1983)).

144. With the exception of the Legal Service Corporation, these programs are discussed
throughout this review. For a discussion of Legal Services in the Reagan era, see Wallace, Out of
Control: Congressand the Legal Service Corporation,in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY
169 (L.
Crowitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989).
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pressures from oversight committees and constituency interests will
dilute the White House agenda.
Reagan White House civil rights centralization efforts clearly suffered from internal and external coordination problems. Internal
problems derived from the existence of several competing strategies of
regulatory relief within the executive. The most visible strategy
commonly associated with the Department of Justice in general and
Civil Rights Division head William Bradford Reynolds in particular
- was moralistic and rhetorically divisive. It viewed preferential
treatment "based on nothing more than personal characteristics of
race or gender ... as [just as] offensive to standardsof human decency
today as it was some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v.
It was also confrontational, calling for immediate
Ferguson ... ."145
and massive judicial, regulatory, and legislative reform.146
The willingness of Justice to launch a frontal assault on numerical
proofs of discrimination and nonvictim relief is unique, however. The
preferred strategy of other civil rights enforcement agencies147
EEOC, OFCC, and OCR - was to leave existing programs on the
books but to limit the effectiveness of those programs through a variety of enforcement strategies. Furthermore, agencies not principally
in the business of civil rights enforcement- even if sympathetic to the
Justice Department's moral imperative - focused their attentions on
other regulatory initiatives. Reagan FCC appointees, for example,
were willing to hold their opposition to minority race preferences in
check in order to advance their deregulatory agenda. Finally, at least
with respect to minority business enterprise programs housed in the
Small Business Administration as well as the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, the Reagan administration and its appointees favored some of the affirmative action initiatives launched by
Presidents Nixon and Carter.'48

These varied strategies ensured a certain degree of disunity in Rea145. OversightHearings on Equal Employment Opportunityand AffirmativeAction, 1981:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunitiesof the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 131, 137 (1981) (citation omitted) (statement of William
Bradford Reynolds); see also Reynolds, Individualism vs. GroupRights: The Legacy of Brown,
93 YALE L.J. 995, 998-1001 (1984) (individual rights best protected through race-neutral
means).
146. This vision shares common ground with ideological attacks on social regulation
launched at the Equal Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the National Highway TrafficSafety Administration. G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 135, at
256-57. Specifically, appointees were chosen for ideological opposition to the Carter administration's regulatory agenda, not substantive expertise with the programs they were to administer;
appointees viewed the agency's permanent career professionals as the enemy; and appointees
were willing to place commitment to an ideological vision ahead of marginal change premised
upon the propriety of scaling down current programs. Id. at 142-43.
147. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
148. See Pear, AdministrationChallenges Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986,
at Al, col. 2.
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gan civil rights policies. Ironically, this disunity can be explained, in
part, by efforts towards White House centralization. Most significant,
"movement conservatives" at Justice and the White House saw themselves in the midst of a holy war that required uniform adherence to
the Justice creed.149 As caricatured by former Education Secretary
T.H. Bell, these "extremists" would say: "Let the chaos come ....
This is part of the revolution! Pragmatism is cowardice and weakness!"150 In the end, however, this absolutist approach undermined
any chance of effective White House centralization.
The keys to this failure are three extraordinary policy blunders
made by the President at the urging of the Department of Justice.
First, Reagan's ostensible commitment to simple nondiscrimination
was called into question when his administration sought in 1982 to
restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private
schools.151 Second, in the midst of this fiasco, Reagan announced his
opposition to provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments
which make disparate racial impact an important evidentiary tool in
voting rights cases.152 In explaining the administration's position, a
"hearingroom full of civil-rights activists erupted into laughter" when
Attorney General Smith remarked that "the President doesn't have a
discriminatorybone in his body."'53 Third, in 1983, President Reagan
(unsuccessfully) sought to remove Mary Frances Berry and two of her
colleagues from the allegedly "independent,bipartisan"U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.154 In their stead, Reagan advanced three nominees who, according to Reagan, "don't worship at the altar of forced
busing and mandatory quotas" and "don't believe you can remedy
past discrimination by mandating new discrimination."155Although
he had good reason to be fed up with the Commission's partisan attacks on his administration,156Reagan's efforts here, as Senator Edward Kennedy put it, appearedto be "an unprecedentedassault on the
independence and integrity of the Civil Rights Commission."157
The costs of these three blunders to White House centralization
149. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
150. Bell, Education Policy Developmentin the Reagan Administration,PHIDELTAKAPPAN,
Mar. 1986, at 487, 491 [hereinafterBell, Education Policy];see also T. BELL,THETHIRTEENTH
MAN 99-113 (1988).
151. I.R.S. News Release, Jan. 8, 1982.
152. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 ? 2, 42 U.S.C. ? 1973b (1982).
153. Finn, supra note 133, at 27.
154. See PresidentFires ThreeMembers of U.S. Commissionon Civil Rights, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at A-l (Oct. 25, 1983). See generally Nomination Hearings, supra note 12.
155. See Weisman, Reagan Defends 3 Nominations to Rights Panel, N.Y. Times News Serv.,
Aug. 1, 1983, reprintedin Nomination Hearings, supra note 12, at 501.
156. See Letter from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to the Vice President, 1 (Feb. 12,
1982) ("The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights views with increasing alarm efforts to end Federal
leadership in promoting equal educational opportunity."); Finn, supra note 133, at 24-25.
157. Nomination Hearings, supra note 12, at 219 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).

1756

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1723

were enormous. Pragmatists within the administration thought it politically unwise for the White House itself to expend further political
capital in this area. Furthermore, Reagan appointees at other agencies
witnessed and learned from these events that confrontational politics
comes at a high cost. Consequently, although kamikaze pilots at the
Department of Justice were allowed to continue their mission, neither
the White House nor other agencies would assist them in it.158
External pressures, principally in the form of legislative oversight,
also stood in the way of White House centralization. The EEOC's
experience was typical. Despite stated objections to both affirmative
action remedies and the 1978 Uniform Guidelines,'59 the EEOC never
formally modified preexisting Carter EEOC regulations. Repeated
oversight hearings,'60 Government Accounting Office investigations
(and threats thereof),161 committee reports,162 confirmation hearings,163 and the power of the purse all moderated the agency's behavior.'64 For example, EEOC chair Clarence Thomas explicitly
158. This apparent discord is best explained by Reagan's noninterventionist approach to
managing department heads. See Bell, Education Policy, supra note 150, at 490. Ironically, Justice's efforts to impose its imprimatur on Reagan civil rights enforcement undermined a more
modest and potentially successful approach. Recurring enforcement strategies of the Reagan
administration generally eschewed repudiation of existing programs in favor of, as George Eads
and Michael Fix observed, "adoption of a new and more exclusive screening criteria for identifying potential violators; unwillingness to test new legal or economic theories that might expand
the existing classes of violators; [and] reduced discretion for field enforcement personnel .. .."
G. EADS& M. FIX,supra note 135, at 193-94. This more modest approach would have been less
subject to political attack and, consequently, might have withstood oversight committee and
constituency group pressure.
159. See Equal Employment OpportunityCommissionPolicies Regarding Goals and Timetables in Litigation Remedies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunitiesof the
House Comm on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986) (statement of Clarence
Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) ("[N]umerically based remedies which focus on sex, race or ethnic considerations have the potential to undermine the ultimate goals of nondiscriminationembodied in Title VII."); see also Hearings, supra note 7, at 354
(statement of C. Thomas).
160. During the Reagan years, Congress held many oversight hearings each year. See generally 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 9-44. Moreover, there were numerous informal contacts between the oversight committees and the EEOC.
NEEDSTOIMPROVE
COMMISSION
ITS
OPPORTUNITY
161. See GAO, EQUALEMPLOYMENT
ANDMANACTIVITIES
ADMINISTRATIVE
(1981); GAO, INQUIRYINTOALLEGEDOPERATING
IN EEOC's OFFICEOFREVIEWAND APPEALS(1982); Letter from Rep.
PROBLEMS
AGEMENT
Augustus Hawkins to Comptroller General Charles Bowsher (July 15, 1985) (requesting GAO
investigation).
162. See, e.g., REPORT,supra note 7.
163. See, e.g., Nomination of Clarence Thomas, of Missouri, to be Chairman of the Equal
Employment OpportunityCommission: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafterThomas Hearings];Nomination of Jeffrey Ira
Zuckerman, of Virginia, to be General Counsel of the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1986).
164. Congress' power of the purse is best revealed in the EEOC's annual budget submission
and the correspondingoversight hearings which accompany that submission. See generally 1987
CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 9-44.
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endorsedthe use of goals and timetables,despitehis personalobjections, at Senatereconfirmation
hearings.165Indeed,on severaloccathe
EEOC
locked
with
the Departmentof Justiceon the
horns
sions,
numericalequalityissue.166Moreover,despitethe WhiteHouse'ssuggestion that the 1978 guidelineswere inefficient,the EEOC left the
guidelinesalone,167apparentlybecausethe politicalcosts of revision
were too high.168
The failureof the ReaganWhite House to centralizecivil rights
enforcementis not surprising.DespiteReagan'sallegedideologicalvision and his attemptsto centralizegovernmentregulation,169
numerous internaland externalpressuresundermineda coordinatedcivil
rights enforcementstrategy. Some of these pressuresare endemicto
all administrations.For example,the inevitablydivergentinterestsof
governmentagenciesand departmentshad previouslydoomedJohnson (pp. 44, 64), Kennedy(pp. 181-84,192),and Carter'70administration efforts at interagencycoordination. However, some of the
problemsthe Reaganadministrationfaced were uniqueunto it. An
overlyideologicalgroupof "movementconservatives,"Reagan'sreliance on delegatingauthorityto like-mindedindividualsto accomplish
centralizationobjectives,'71and the simple fact that the Reaganadministrationwas swimmingagainstthe politicalcurrent'72were cir165. See Thomas Hearings, supra note 163, at 44.
166. These disputes concerned Justice's representation of the EEOC before the Supreme
Court, intervention in lower federal court cases in which the EEOC was a party, and refusal to
comply with EEOC affirmativeaction guidelines for federal agencies and departments. See 1987
CRC REPORT,
supra note 6, at 40-42; see also Letter from Clarence Thomas to Attorney General
Smith reprintedin Hearing beforeSubcommitteeon Constitutionaland Civil Rights, House Judiciary Committee, May 6, 1983.
167. See Barringer,Job Bias Debate is Reopened, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1981, at A27, col. 2;
1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 24.
168. OIRA's influence was more profound in deterring the EEOC from adopting expansive
age discrimination regulations. After the EEOC in 1984 decided to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to apprenticeship training programs, OIRA returned the rule to the
agency "expressingconcern that prohibiting apprenticeshipprograms [from] imposing age limits
might prevent employers from recovering the cost of training." Selected Statements Delivered
January 28, 1988 to the House Select Committeeon Aging, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 19, at E1 (Jan. 28, 1988) (testimony of Clarence Thomas). In 1987, the EEOC formally concurred with
OIRA on this matter. See id.
169. See generally 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 40-42, 61, 71, 93-4, 100.
170. See U.S. COMMN.ON Civ. RIGHTS,THE FEDERALCIVILRIGHTSENFORCEMENT
EFFORT- 1977, TO ELIMINATE
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION:
A SEQUEL331 (1977) (federal
agencies disagreed with each other "as to the meaning of discrimination and how discrimination,
once identified, should be remedied."); J. CALIFANO,
supra note 31, at 240-41 (describing conflicts within Carter administration strategy in Bakke litigation); L. FISHER,CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES 27 n.68 (1988) (describing conflicts between White House and Department of Justice); Kneeland, Sears Sues U.S. over Job Bias Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 1
(Sears charged the federal government with promulgating conflicting requirements in federal
employment law.).
171. But see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
172. Indeed, even business - presumably saddled with the burdens of affirmativeaction
opposed Reagan initiatives here. Cf. H. BELZ,supra note 48, at 196-200; Seligman, Affirmative
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cumstances peculiar to the Reagan administration.
That the Reagan administrationdid not speak with one voice highlights the difficulty of coordinating civil rights policy in the modem
administrative state. That difficulty, however, contrary to Graham's
suggestion, does not mean that the White House is without substantial
power in this area.
AdministrativeDiscretion to Alter Regulatory Policymaking. The
Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about the limits of
agency power to modify existing regulatory structures. Direct repeal
of existing interpretationsand regulations is unlikely to succeed. Indirect attacks launched through agency reorganizationand policy prioritization are far more likely to succeed.
Enforcement agencies seeking to repeal existing programs are
likely to confront a potent legislative attack. FCC efforts to rescind
the granting of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by
the enactment of single-year funding restrictions forbidding such reconsideration.173This direct challenge to existing rulemaking, combined with the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, "so poisoned
relations between the two entities that it stimulated congressional
oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is unprecedented."174Congress has used its power of the purse in other ways to
correct agencies which disregard their past and, with it, legislative
preferences. Such was the fate suffered by the Reagan appointee
driven U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Unwilling to play ball with
Congress, the Commission - in addition to being subjected to an extensive GAO audit'75- had its appropriationsseverely reduced and
was directed by Congress to pursue specified research priorities and to
allocate its appropriationsinternally according to a restrictive legislative formula.176Finally, Congress used its confirmationpower to punAction is Here to Stay, FORTUNE,Apr. 19, 1982, at 143, 162. The primary cost of swimming
against the political current, however, is the cost of doing battle with civil rights interest groups.
For those who oppose numerical proofs of discrimination and affirmativeaction programs, the
power of civil rights is analogous to powerful special interests throughout government. The
difference in civil rights is that, unlike farm supports, trade tariffs, etc., policymaking implicates
fundamental moral and economic concerns. This is a differencethat matters. At the same time,
the focus of concern should not be the efforts of special interests (for democratic free market
politics dictates that special interests will advance their claims); instead, the focus should be on
the ability of elected government to distinguish civil rights concerns from other types of
concerns.
173. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101-Stat. 1329, 1329-31-32; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17; Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 1020.
174. Micromanagementof the FCC: Here to Stay, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56.
175. See Brock, Politicizing the Government'sWatchdog,Wall St. J., July 16, 1986, ? 1, at 22,
col. 3.
176. See Kurtz, Hill Slashes Funding for Rights Panel, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1986, at A12,
col. 4. See generally Comment, supra note 12, 492-95 (1987).
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ish individuals within the administration who spearheaded
confrontational operations. William Bradford Reynolds' appointment
to the Associate Attorney General position at the Department of Justice was turned down,177as were the nominations of Jeffrey Zuckerman (to EEOC general counsel)178and John Agresto (to Archivist).'79
Interestingly, each of these exercises of congressional power was indirect. Congress never enacted substantive legislative amendments to
correct administrativeexegesis; rather, it relied on temporal measures
such as single-year appropriationsand the confirmation of single administration appointments.
Enforcement agencies fare much better when the chosen weapons
for change are reorganization,policy prioritization, and the simplification of existing regulations. These changes neither require congressional support nor do they force an agency to call attention to changes
in existing policy.
The ostensible purposes of agency reorganizations are to "maximize efficiency and economy, promote effective planning and coordination, reduce program fragmentation and overlap, eliminate
unnecessary paperwork, and increase accountability."'80 During the
Reagan years, however, reorganizationsalso enabled political appointees to maintain greater control over their operations. For example,
the EEOC created an Office of Legal Counsel charged with interagency coordination and the drafting of regulations.18' The Civil
Rights Commission also traveled this road by creating an Office of
Program and Policy Review to play the lead role in the drafting of
Commission reports. Since political appointees fill these new offices
with a cadre of trustworthy individuals, these offices - especially at
the Civil Rights Commission - were used as workhorses of the new
regime.'82

Policy prioritization enables agencies to displace problematic programs in favor of preferredprograms. The EEOC proved the agency
most adept at policy prioritization during the Reagan years. In Sep177. See Dickinson, Running Scared in Pennsylvania: Sen. SpecterAims to Survivein Democratic Territory,Wash. Post, July 6, 1985, at A4, col. 1; Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted
Down, Wash. Post, June 28, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Duke, Senate Panel Rejects Reagan Nomineefor
Associate Attorney General Post, Wall St. J., June 28, 1985, ? 1, at 3, col. 2.
178. Thornton, Senate Rejects EEOC Nomination: Commentson Discrimination WereIssue,
Wash. Post, May 21, 1986, at A23.
179. Werner, Senate Panel Derails Nominationfor Archives,N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at D16, col. 4.
180. G. EADS& M. FIX, supra note 135, at 156.
181. See 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 18-19.
182. Correlatively,when budget cuts forced the dismissal of agency employees, the ax disproportionately fell on "old line" pre-Reagan staffers. See, e.g., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT

ON THE CLOSING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION'S REGIONAL

OFFICES (1986) (news release on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review),

cited in Comment, supra note 12, at 494 n.258.
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tember 1984, the agency announced it would place greater emphasis
on litigation to secure redress for identifiedvictims of employment discrimination.183 The agency's emphasis on individual make-whole relief meant that fewer resources were available to pursue class action
cases - whose remedies often included goals, timetables, and quotas.184 Yet pursuit of this individualized approach left existing regulations and directives used in class action litigation unaffected.'85
Furthermore, class action litigation was not eliminated, just reduced
(from sixty-seven percent, in fiscal year 1980, to thirty-five percent, in
fiscal year 1986, of all nonsubpoena cases).'86 Consequently, while
members of Congress disapproved of this approach,'87 the EEOC's
shift from one legitimate policy objective to another did not raise legislative ire to the retaliation point.
The EEOC also proved adept at policymaking through inaction,
that is, through refusing to adopt reform initiatives. During the Reagan years, for example, the agency rejected comparable worth as a
mechanism of determiningjob discrimination under Title VII,188declined to extend Title VII to professional certificationand licensing,189
and refused to adopt regulations extending the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to apprenticeship programs.190These refusals did
not alter the status quo ante and hence were not readily subject to
legislative attack.
Policymaking through the simplification of existing procedures is
yet another device that enables agencies to attack regulatory excesses
without challenging the bottom line. Take the case of the Reagan
OFCC.191 Although not challenging the Executive Order program,
the OFCC modified the program through internal directives, orders,
183. EEOC Commissioners'Memorandum, Statement of Enforcement Policy, Sept. 11, 1984
reprintedin REPORT,supra note 7, at 104-07.
184. Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTICMONTHLY,Feb. 1987, at 70, 80.
185. See 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 24.
186. See id. at 38. One explanation for declining class action filings is that employers, after
years of experience with Title VII demands, are less likely to commit class wrongs over time.
Yet, in stark contrast to this "simple economics" argument, the Carter EEOC sought to shift
resources from individual cases to "the equally vital task of identifying and attacking employment systems that illegally operated to exclude whole classes of people from jobs or promotions."
Leach, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the EEOC: An Agency in the Midst of Change, 29
MERCERL. REV. 661, 669 (1978).
187. See Letter from Rep. Augustus Hawkins, supra note 161.
188. EEOC Decision No. 85-80 (1985 EEOC Lexis 19) (June 17, 1985; reissued with corrections July 12, 1985) (comparableworth decision). By contrast, the Carter administrationseemed
ready to endorse comparable worth. In 1979, Carter EEOC chair Eleanor Holmes Norton depicted comparable worth as the most important issue of the 1980s. See Krucoff, Money: The
Question of Men, Women and "ComparableWorth,"Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1979, at B5, col. 1.
189. EEOC Decision No. 87-2, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) ? 6869 (Aug.
31, 1987).
190. See supra note 168.
191. See text accompanying notes 60-61.

May 1991]

The Civil Rights Hydra

1761

and notices.192 OFCC, moreover, told its regional managers "not to
require or to accept affirmative action plans with goals exceeding
availability unless there were identifiable victims of discrimination. . ."193 Ironically, the OFCC ultimately reverted to much of its
Carter era enforcement strategy as a result of congressional pressures
fueled by the failed efforts of William BradfordReynolds and others to
have President Reagan rescind Executive Order 11,246.194
The Reagan years then tell a cautionary tale about executive
power. Implementation strategies with modest objectives can move
agency policymaking in the direction of administration priorities.
However, once constituency and congressional expectations are well
settled, efforts to replace existing approaches with a new regime will
meet tremendous resistance. Since Congress holds the ultimate trump
card with, among other things, its power of the purse, direct attacks
such as those launched by the FCC and Civil Rights Commission
seem doomed to failure. Consequently, after the enactment of legislation and promulgation of initial agency regulations and interpretation,
executive power lies principally at the margins. As such, White House
centralization efforts cannot rewrite the nation's civil rights agenda.
Furthermore, only a jerry-rigged structure can be assembled with the
tools of executive power - appointments, reorganization, policy prioritization - and hence it is unlikely for a president to establish a civil
rights legacy.
Reagan's Legacy. Aside from judicial appointments, Reagan's attempts at centralizing civil rights enforcement will likely have little
lasting effect. The Reagan administrationspent some significant political capital in opposing voting rights legislation, vetoing the Civil
Rights Restoration Act, supporting tax breaks for discriminatory private schools, and enabling the Justice Department to launch a frontal
assault on preferential hiring. In paying the bill for these unpopular
policies, moreover, the Reagan administration received very little in
return. Internal discord and external pressures ultimately left the
Reagan civil rights agenda in disrepair. The Reagan experience then
cautions against serious White House centralization efforts that vary
significantly from constituency and legislative expectations.
192. See H. BELZ,supra note 48, at 194; see also 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 82-83.
193. Id. at 82 (referring to OFCCP Memorandum for Area Office Directors). OFCC also
eased pressure on national corporations by permitting the adoption of standardized affirmative
action plans. See H. BELZ,supra note 48, at 194.
194. See, e.g., Statement of Deputy Under Secretaryof Labor Meisinger on OFCCP Enforcement Before House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, reprintedin Daily Lab.
Report (BNA), at E-l (June 5, 1987); see also Letter from Larry Rogers to Susan Prado (July 7,
1987), reprintedin 1987 CRC REPORT,supra note 6, at 135. The "liberalization"of the OFCCP
can be attributed, in part, to congressional pressure. See, e.g., Statements Before the House
Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities at Oversight Hearing on Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at F-1 (June 4, 1987) (statement of
Rep. Augustus Hawkins).
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George Bush's strategy is proof positive of this lesson. Rather than
follow "in the tradition of Ronald Reagan," as the 1988 Republican
platform puts it,195 the Bush administrationis clearly unwilling to stay
the course in civil rights. Critical appointments at the Department of
Education, Federal Communications Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Civil Rights Commission suggest
dramatic differencesbetween Bush's approach to civil rights and Reagan's.196 Moreover, although he vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
Bush's support of the Americans with Disabilities Act and minority
scholarship programs further highlights differences between the two
administrations.
The Reagan experience offers a telling supplement to The Civil
Rights Era. With legislative programs in place and hence little opportunity to exert the type of raw power available during an agency's nascent development, White House policymaking operates within a
culture of settled expectations. Consequently, the White House must
face the external pressures of oversight committees and constituency
interests. Centralization, moreover, is complicated by the internal
pressures associated with the extraordinary sweep of modern civil
rights enforcement. During the Reagan years, competing policy agendas from within the administration seriously curtailed centralization
efforts. Yet, contrary to Graham's assertions, the problem of centralization was not one of bureaucratsrun amok. Career bureaucratsdid
not derail the Reagan administration, for White House appointees
generally seemed unsympathetic to the careerist's perspective.197Instead, the lesson of "full policy cycle" implementation is that internal
and external pressures limit the scope of White House centralization.
For example, marginal administrativeadjustmentssuch as reorganization, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification appear
more successful than direct conflict. In fact, policy blunders associated with the confrontationalapproach cost the administrationdearly.
The Bush administration,for example, responded to these Reagan initiatives by distancing itself so much from its Republican predecessor
that Reagan's civil rights legacy amounts to very little indeed. In the
end, the Reagan administrationwould have been better served by marginal administrativeadjustments such as reorganization, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification than direct conflict.
The Reagan years, however, do not speak to the futility of White
House centralization. Iron triangles, contrary to Graham's depiction,
195. 1988 Republican Party Platform reprintedin CONG.Q. 2369, 2399 (Aug. 20, 1988).
196. See Devins, The Civil Rights Commission'sBackslide, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, ? 1, at
14, col. 4. Contrary to the title of my opinion piece (written by editorial page writers with a
point of view of their own), I do not necessarily perceive that differencesbetween the Bush and
Reagan administrations represent changes for the worse.
197. See DeregulationHQ REGULATION,
Mar./Apr. 1981, at 22-23 (interview of Murray L.
Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III by Antonin Scalia and Anne Brunsdale, editors).
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are impediments,not obstructions.The successof the ReaganEEOC
is testamentto this. Yet, when the political context dictates, the
White House must be willingto play the game of subtlebureaucratic
maneuvering,and this gamepromisesonly a modestpayoff. Henceit
is in accord with Graham'scentral contentionabout the limits of
White House power.
IV.

CONCLUSION: ALL Is WELL IN MUDVILLE

Proponentsof a strong executiveare likely to find disheartening
the combinedlessonsof The CivilRightsEra and the Reaganexperience. Agencies appearinherentlyresistantto administrationdirectives; legislative and interest group pressures exacerbate these
difficulties;and courtopinionsappeara disruptivewild card. Furthermore,secondarypolicymakingdevicesthat workwithinexistingregulatory regimesoften serve as the principalmechanismfor executive
influence. Interestingly,proponentsof an imperialCongress,too, are
likely to be disturbedby both Graham'saccount and the Reagan
years. The WhiteHouse appearscoequalin the enactmentof legislation,198and agencies(frequentlycontrolledby the executive)play the
lead role in both the interpretationand implementationof legislation.
Indeed, Congressmust resort to a host of oversighttechniques
rangingfrom hearingsto explicitbudgetaryconstraints- to protect
its lawmakingrole. Weaknessin executiveandlegislativepower,however, does not mean that agenciesreignsupreme. Presidentialpower
to appoint, submit budgets, approve reorganizations,and monitor
rulemakingseverelylimit agency power. Congress'oversighttechniquesas well as its abilityto modifysubstantivelaw also undermine
agencycontrol. Furthermore,legislativeand executiveprioritiesmay
be at odds, thus makingit impossiblefor an agency to please both
198. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is proof positive of the president'sinstrumental role in the
shaping of legislation. When proposed, the Act, among other things, demanded that an employer demonstrate that her employment practices are "essential to effective job performance"
whenever a group of employment practices "results in a disparate impact .. ." S. 2104, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (emphasis added). After President
Bush threatened to veto the measure, bill sponsors made significantconcessions. Under the compromise measure, the complaining party, where practicable, had to identify "which specific [emH.R. Rep. No. 755,
ployment] practice or practices contributed to the disparate impact ...."
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) (Conference Report) (emphasis added). Moreover, to defend selection practices, the employer need only show that "the practice or group of practices ... bear a
significant relationshipto successful performance of the job" to sustain her burden of proof. Id.
at 2. Despite these compromise efforts, President Bush vetoed the bill, and the veto was sustained. See Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights Bill Veto, Dooming Measurefor 1990, Wash.
Post, Oct. 25, 1990, at A15, col. 1. The success of the Bush veto suggests that the president, not
congressional sponsors, may well be in the driver's seat in defining the terms of this debate. See
Kenworthy and Lee, Civil Rights Compromiseis Readied; House Democrats' Proposal Includes
ControversialCap, Wash. Post, May 17, 1991, at Al. This conclusion is bolstered by the House
of Representative'sJune 5, 1991, failure to approve the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by a veto-proof
majority. See Kenworthy, House ApprovesCivil Rights Bill; 273-158 Vote Would Not Override
Veto, Wash. Post, June 6, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
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constituencies. Consequently, contrary to Graham's assertions, bureaucracies do not reign supreme.199
The end result is that the power to make and implement the law is
diffuse rather than centralized in one branch of government or another. Moreover, as Terry Moe recognizes, "[t]he [increasing] layering of presidential bureaucracy upon congressional bureaucracy ...
will likely become a still more consequential - and organizationally
disruptive -

feature of American government

...."9200

This state of

affairs,however, is precisely how modem government should work the legislative and the executive branches are neither supreme nor
without power; agencies serve as conciliators responding to competing
executive and legislative pressures.
The enactment and enforcementof civil rights laws then provides a
model of the workings of modern government. While bemoaning the
ultimate impotency of executive power, Hugh Davis Graham's The
Civil Rights Era reveals that the executive possesses great power (if not
control) - especially in the law enactment phase. The Reagan experience likewise reveals that the executive can play an important - albeit
transitory - role in the implementation of the law. While the Reagan
White House may have poorly managed its power delegation, the administration's failure here is largely the failure of politics and not the
failure of the presidency.
199. The judiciary, while an important player, is more a wild card than a lead actor and,
hence, I think it would be inappropriateto speak of judicial supremacy in the same way that I
refer to legislative, executive, and administrationsupremacy. Granted, in some instances, disappointed constituent interests advance their policy objectives through the courts. See generally
J. RABKIN,supra note 92. Indeed, on occasion, the courts - through the enforcement of injunctive relief - effectively transform government agencies into agencies of constituent interests. See
id. at 147-81 (discussing "capture"of OCR through Adams lawsuit). Yet, these occurrences are
rare and likely not to occur in the future. See Williams, Fingers in the Pie (Book Review), 68
TEXAS L. REV. 1303 (1990) (reviewing J. Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions). Instead, it is far more
likely that courts will defer to agency statutory interpretations and hence defeat these interest
group efforts. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (agency interpretationsare entitled to great deference, including the filling in of gaps left
by Congress);cf J. RABKINsupra note 92, at 81 (noting that the SupremeCourt's Chevronruling
"took it for granted that judges must hold executive operatives to those standardswhich they can
discern as being intended by the enacting Congress"). At this level, the judiciary will function
much as it did in The Civil Rights Era, that is, enabling the EEOC and other agencies to control
the meaning of legislation. Indeed, since legislative delegations are often broad, agency interpretations - as Graham suggests - serve as an important policymaking tool. This is the lesson of
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), a recent Supreme Court decision approving the Reagan
administration'spolicy-driven interpretationof a 1970 family planning statute to forbid federally
funded family planning centers from mentioning abortion. See also Bryner, Congress, Courts,
and Agencies: Equal Employment and the Limits of Policy Implementation, 96 POL.SCI.Q. 411

(1981).
GOVERN267,
200. Moe, The Politics of BureaucraticStructure, in CAN THEGOVERNMENT
328 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1989). Moe further recognizes that "compromise"and "uncertainty" in American government makes both winning and losing groups impose "protective
structures they know are impediments to effective performance." Id. at 327. Finally, "because
presidents are constitutionally empowered and politically induced to control executive agencies,
they cannot be stopped from acting to impose structures of their own that may be quite incompatible with those prescribed by Congress." Id.
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The Civil Rights Era, despite its many strengths, could benefit from
a tighter, more analytically focused presentation. The book is too
much like a travelogue and too little like a proof. Too much responsibility is placed on the reader to tie together Graham's assertions of
agency power, White House centralization, and the rise of group
rights. Graham's argument also would benefit from both a fuller
treatment of existing topics (EEOC testing, early agency support of
numerical proofs) and the inclusion of other relevant topics (race and
education, minority business enterprise). Graham also goes too far in
using the "imperial presidency" as his normative benchmark. That
there is room for improvement, however, does not mean that the book
does not succeed admirably. It does, but there is clearly room
improvement.
The Civil Rights Era (and the Reagan experience) reveals the limits of White House centralization in civil rights. Graham's interpretation of these limitations as reflective of a tragic weakening of the
presidency is subject to debate. In my view, limits on White House
centralization are a necessary feature of the administrative state.
While I disagree with Graham on this matter, I am mightily glad to
have been able to base my judgment on a reading of The Civil Rights
Era's lucid chronicling of the 1960-1972 period.

